Kent Jenkins Jr.”
post_date=”November 19, 2026 07:18″
pUrl=”https://www.fairobserver.com/politics/historic-midterm-elections-mark-new-era-for-america/” pid=”165330″
post-content=”
Fair Observer’s Editor-in-Chief, Atul Singh, and Kent Jenkins Jr., a former political reporter from The Washington Post turned communications consultant, examine the Democratic sweep in the 2026 US midterm elections. Speaking on November 8, they trace how anger over the cost of living and dissatisfaction with US President Donald Trump helped Democrats win back both chambers of Congress and make inroads in Republican strongholds. They also ask what Democrats can deliver for working-class voters while Trump remains in the White House and what the results might mean for the 2028 presidential race.
A wave reaches Republican strongholds
Jenkins calls the midterms a “generational political event.” He cites an estimate of 120 million votes cast, second only to 2018 among midterms in more than a century. Democrats won Senate races in Texas and South Carolina, while Adam Hamilton became the first Democrat in 94 years to win a US Senate seat in Kansas. In Mississippi, Jenkins says the Democratic challenger appears poised to unseat a Republican incumbent. (Since this conversation, Democrat Scott Colom has won in Mississippi.)
North Carolina shows how far the wave reaches. Jenkins points to former Governor Roy Cooper’s 20-point Senate victory and a reversal in the state’s US House delegation, from ten Republicans and four Democrats to ten Democrats and four Republicans. The result recalls the 1994 midterms, when Republicans led by Newt Gingrich captured Congress during US President Bill Clinton’s administration. Singh wonders whether 2026 closes the political era that began then. Jenkins sees a dramatic shift and argues that its durability will only become clear in hindsight.
How Democrats reconnected with voters
Jenkins attributes much of the turnout to frustration with Trump. He links rising prices to tariffs and the war with Iran. Many Americans already struggling to pay their bills grew angrier as they came to believe Trump was using the presidency to enrich himself. Yet Democrats entered the election with poor favorability ratings of their own. Jenkins credits them with recruiting candidates who had ties to communities the party had struggled to reach, including a Maine logger, a North Carolina farmer and South Texas Tejano singer Bobby Pulido.
Pulido’s Republican opponent suggested that the race should have little to do with whom voters wanted to sing at a niece’s quinceañera. Pulido responded by performing at the celebrations. In Texas and Kansas, respectively, Senate candidates James Talarico, a Presbyterian seminary graduate, and Hamilton, a Methodist pastor, drew on scripture and invoked the Good Samaritan. Singh contends that Democrats also regained ground by talking about the costs of childcare, healthcare and housing, issues he says the party had allowed cultural disputes to crowd out.
The working-class anger behind the vote is personal for Jenkins. As a teenager in western North Carolina, he worked in a cotton mill and loaded trailers for a trucking company. Both employers are gone. Singh connects those losses to the promises of the globalization era, when workers were told that displaced industries would give way to better jobs. Trump found an audience among people who felt those promises had failed them. Jenkins believes that Trump’s brand of politics lost much of its appeal in the midterms. Whether Democrats can hold those voters depends on what they do with the opportunity.
A divided government faces its first tests
Jenkins reads Trump’s choice of Stephen Miller as White House chief of staff as a sign that the administration will take a hard line with the incoming Congress. Singh points to House Democratic leader Hakeem Jeffries’s support for impeaching Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth as an early indication of how quickly the two sides could clash. He expects fights over government funding and judicial confirmations, alongside congressional investigations into the administration.
Both parties also face internal disputes. Republicans must decide how much of Trump’s political approach to carry into 2028. Democrats must reconcile the priorities of candidates like Talarico with those of the party’s democratic socialist wing. Those differences will matter when congressional leaders have to decide which campaign promises to turn into legislation and where to seek agreement with the White House.
The stakes beyond Washington
Singh argues that the economic pressures behind the vote extend well beyond Congress. Disruption in the Strait of Hormuz has made US households feel the cost of a war overseas. He also questions whether investment in artificial intelligence can sustain its current pace and warns that a downturn could hit white-collar employment. Jenkins observes that problems of that scale are beyond the reach of any single bill or executive order.
Jenkins calls the midterms “the opening act.” The victories give Democrats a wider electoral map heading into 2028 and the power to set Congress’s agenda in January. Over the next two years, voters will see what that power can achieve under divided government. For the communities that gave Democrats another chance, the test will be whether their support brings changes they can feel in their daily lives.
[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
”
post-content-short=”
Fair Observer’s Editor-in-Chief, Atul Singh, and Kent Jenkins Jr., a former political reporter from The Washington Post turned communications consultant, examine the Democratic sweep in the 2026 US midterm elections. Speaking on November 8, they trace how anger over the cost of living and…”
post_summery=”In this episode of FO Talks, Atul Singh and Kent Jenkins Jr. examine how Democrats won back both chambers of Congress and broke through in Republican strongholds. Anger over rising prices hurt Trump, and candidates with strong local ties helped Democrats regain working-class voters. A divided government will test whether Democrats can deliver the relief voters want in 2028.”
post-date=”Nov 19, 2026″
post-title=”Historic Midterm Elections Mark New Era for America” slug-data=”historic-midterm-elections-mark-new-era-for-america”>
Historic Midterm Elections Mark New Era for America
James M. Dorsey”
post_date=”November 18, 2026 06:13″
pUrl=”https://www.fairobserver.com/region/middle_east_north_africa/fo-talks-why-peace-in-the-middle-east-has-now-become-completely-impossible/” pid=”165313″
post-content=”
Fair Observer’s Chief Strategy Officer, Peter Isackson, speaks with journalist and author James M. Dorsey about the narrowing possibilities for resolving the Israel–Palestine conflict. With Israeli elections approaching, they examine whether decades of settlement expansion have made a Palestinian state unattainable and whether a different government would change Israel’s course. Their discussion connects this impasse to US military support, Saudi normalization, stalled plans for Gaza and the confrontation with Iran.
How partition became impractical
Dorsey recalls advocating two states in the early 1970s, when the idea faced resistance on both sides. Palestinians sought a secular democratic state with equal rights for Jews and Palestinian Arabs, while Israel insisted on maintaining a Jewish state after its territorial expansion in the 1967 war. The Palestine Liberation Organization’s eventual acceptance of partition in 1988 followed a lengthy internal struggle over recognition, armed struggle and territorial compromise.
Meanwhile, Israeli settlements expanded. Dorsey emphasizes that the policy began under Labor governments, justified through security arguments. After former Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin’s 1977 election victory, successive governments increasingly justified settlements through claims to the land itself. Negotiations offered Palestinians autonomy while retaining Israeli security control, rather than sovereign statehood.
Today, Dorsey puts the settler population at roughly 750,000. Partition would require deciding whether settlers remain under Palestinian jurisdiction, remain within Israel through changes to the borders or leave. He considers the political obstacles overwhelming and describes the two-state framework as “an illusion that’s being upheld.”
Yet the alternatives offer little reassurance. Given entrenched hostility, Dorsey fears a single state could produce civil war. Indefinite Israeli domination and recurring violence are also unsustainable. Diplomacy continues invoking partition partly because no acceptable replacement has emerged. Even a successful partition would leave difficult questions unresolved, including the future of Palestinian refugees and the relationship between two neighboring, potentially antagonistic states.
Elections without a strategic break
Isackson asks whether Israel’s internal divisions could threaten its stability. Dorsey rejects the suggestion that a Jewish civil war is approaching. Polarization over Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and tensions between religious and secular Israelis are real, but he distinguishes these disputes from disagreements over fundamental security policies.
In Dorsey’s assessment, substantial support for settlements, opposition to Palestinian statehood and a more assertive military strategy extends beyond the governing coalition. An opposition government might pay greater attention to international opinion, repair diplomatic relationships and soften its rhetoric. He nevertheless expects considerable continuity in policy.
The election therefore revolves heavily around Netanyahu’s political survival. Different coalition combinations remain possible, including an opposition administration potentially supported by an Israeli Palestinian party. A different coalition, however, would not necessarily bring greater support for the concessions needed to restart negotiations.
American support and regional limits
Isackson presses Dorsey on whether deteriorating international support could force change. Dorsey acknowledges growing criticism but cautions against assuming that external isolation automatically destabilizes a government with substantial domestic backing.
He identifies negotiations over US military assistance as an important test. The existing decade-long arrangement, signed under US President Barack Obama, provides $3.8 billion annually. Dorsey outlines proposals to reduce direct assistance gradually while shifting Israel toward purchasing American equipment, alongside Netanyahu’s stated ambition for military self-sufficiency within ten years.
Saudi Arabia offers no substitute security guarantor. Dorsey recalls commercial and security contacts stretching back decades, including Israeli intermediaries selling nonlethal equipment to Saudi buyers. Turning those informal ties into diplomatic relations, however, would require Israeli concessions on Palestinian statehood.
After Gaza, he argues, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman needs a credible, irreversible path toward Palestinian statehood. Dorsey sees little prospect of an Israeli government delivering that commitment. Morocco illustrates another constraint: Its government cultivates Israeli ties while public opinion remains strongly sympathetic to Palestinians.
Gaza’s blocked political transition
For Dorsey, Gaza exposes the gulf between diplomatic plans and implementation. He describes expanding Israeli territorial control, restricted aid deliveries and Palestinian technocrats prevented from entering to administer daily affairs. The proposed stabilization force has yet to materialize in his account.
Nevertheless, he calls US President Donald Trump’s Board of Peace “the only game in town.” With several countries participating and Hamas engaging with the plan, Dorsey sees a possible opening for negotiations, despite its shortcomings.
That potential depends on American pressure. Dorsey contends that Israel has obstructed implementation and that Trump has shown little willingness to compel Netanyahu to cooperate. Without agreement on an eventual political settlement, administrative proposals cannot resolve the underlying conflict.
Iran and the limits of coercion
Turning to Iran, Dorsey characterizes the confrontation after the initial joint bombing campaign as primarily American–Iranian, with Israel largely sidelined. America can devastate Iran militarily, he stresses, without achieving its political goals.
He also challenges portrayals of Trump as wholly inconsistent. Beneath tactical unpredictability, Dorsey sees a persistent belief that economic pressure and further bombing can force Iranian submission. Iran remains equally committed to outlasting that pressure. Military strength offers an assured route to political resolution in neither conflict.
[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
”
post-content-short=”
Fair Observer’s Chief Strategy Officer, Peter Isackson, speaks with journalist and author James M. Dorsey about the narrowing possibilities for resolving the Israel–Palestine conflict. With Israeli elections approaching, they examine whether decades of settlement expansion have made a…”
post_summery=”In this episode of FO Talks, Peter Isackson and James M. Dorsey examine how settlement expansion has undermined prospects for a two-state solution. A change in Israeli leadership seems unlikely to alter core policies toward Palestinians, and Gaza’s proposed political transition remains stalled. The US/Israel–Iran war further exposes the gap between military power and lasting solutions.”
post-date=”Nov 18, 2026″
post-title=”FO Talks: Why Peace in the Middle East Has Now Become Completely Impossible” slug-data=”fo-talks-why-peace-in-the-middle-east-has-now-become-completely-impossible”>
FO Talks: Why Peace in the Middle East Has Now Become Completely Impossible
Glenn Carle”
post_date=”November 13, 2026 06:26″
pUrl=”https://www.fairobserver.com/politics/france-erupts-in-mass-protests-yet-again/” pid=”165256″
post-content=”
Fair Observer’s Editor-in-Chief, Atul Singh, and FOI Senior Partner Glenn Carle, a retired CIA officer who now advises companies, governments and organizations on geopolitical risk, discuss France’s deepening political and fiscal crisis. Protesters across France are demanding stronger public services while the heavily indebted state is struggling to sustain its existing commitments. With parliament paralyzed, borrowing costs rising and political extremes gaining ground, Atul and Glenn explore whether France can break this recurring cycle — and what failure could mean for next year’s presidential election and the future of the euro.
School protests and the wider revolt
Since mid-September, hundreds of thousands of demonstrators have marched through French cities such as Paris, Marseille, Lyon, Rennes and Toulouse to protest the government. On Saturday, October 25, the French Interior Ministry estimated the number of protesters to be 410,000 while the union organizers claimed 800,000. The government deployed 70,000 police and imposed restrictions in several cities.
The French government’s underinvestment in education triggered these protests. One sign captured the public sentiment: “Schools with no money, a country with no future.”
Initially, students led these protests. Now, parents, teachers and unions, as well as elements of the populist-left, have joined them. Rioting, arson and vandalism have accompanied the protests, and police have responded with tear-gas and baton charges. Authorities have jailed hundreds for criminal activity after fast-tracked court hearings. Prime Minister Sébastien Lecornu has accused the populist-left of fueling the violence, which the left denies vehemently. In turn, it blames the government for using protests to gain political advantage in next year’s elections.
Political extremes gain as the center falters
Amid the protests, on Sunday, October 25, far-right party Rassemblement National (RN) leader Marine Le Pen kicked off her presidential campaign in Orléans, the historic city in the heart of the Loire Valley. She is leading Jean-Luc Mélenchon of La France Insoumise, the left-wing party that holds second place. The traditional parties have imploded, the extremes have taken charge and political analysts increasingly worry about the future.
Orléans has immense historical significance in France. The city is associated with Jeanne d’Arc, better known in English as Joan of Arc, who is regarded as a patron saint of France. She is revered for her role in the siege of Orléans and securing the coronation of Charles VII of France during the Hundred Years’ War. To this day, Jeanne d’Arc is honored as a defender of the French nation and Le Pen is portraying herself as a modern day heroine in the same tradition.
Le Pen is doing well because France is teetering at the brink. Politico journalists Giorgio Leali and Clea Cleacutt have declared France the “sickest man of Europe” trapped in “a vicious cycle of fiscal and social crises.” Protesters are calling for more public investment in schools and other public services precisely at a time when the government has no money. Since French President Emmanuel Macron held snap elections in 2024, the government has struggled to pass a budget in parliament.
Macron’s prime ministers have come and gone. Michel Barnier and François Bayrou did not survive long, lasting three and nine months, respectively. Macron’s lackey, Sébastien Lecornu, had to resign in 2025 and then return through the back door four days later. Three blocs in parliament cannot agree on much and political paralysis has crippled France.
Debt markets tighten the squeeze
France’s debt is about €3.5 trillion ($3.9 trillion), 119% of the GDP. Borrowing costs have risen to their highest level since 2008. The government spends more on interest payments than on defense or education. Lecornu’s budget for 2027 promises €54 billion ($60 billion) in savings but the deficit will remain over 5% of the GDP, well above the European Union’s 3% cap for budget deficits. Former Italian Prime Minister Mario Monti, who dealt with Italy’s debt crisis in 2011, points out that France has long been seen as the EU’s “spoiled child.”
During Monti’s time, the spread between Italian and German ten-year bonds shot up from around 150 basis points to more than 500 within a few months. The spread between French and German debt reached 177.7 basis points on October 22, its widest since November 2011 during the euro zone debt crisis. A basis point is one-hundredth of a percentage point, i.e. 0.01%. The same day, France’s benchmark ten-year yield was last up 6.5 basis points at 5.06%, after previously touching 5.1415%, its highest level since July 2002. Of all the G7 countries, France has suffered most from the debt sell-off triggered by the US/Israel–Iran War.
Now, the operative question is whether the European Central Bank (ECB) would intervene if bond markets lose confidence in France. Pro-Europeans are convinced that European institutions are now much stronger and the ECB will be able to save France, just as it saved Greece and Italy. Euroskeptics remain unconvinced. They think France is not too big to fail but too big to save, and could doom the euro. The currency has already fallen to a 17-month low against the dollar and elections next year could throw in a nasty surprise.
Painting a restless picture
What distinguishes this crisis from all previous ones, going back to the ancien regime? As it turns out, just about nothing. France has a brittle, top-down system that recurrently breaks. The country finds it difficult to reform and stays paralyzed in outdated structures. Dissatisfied citizens blame the state for a betrayal of the compact — underfunded schools, severe teacher shortages and crumbling infrastructure, cost-of-living, austerity versus “sovereignty” — while demanding that the state solve the problem by doing more of what it had been doing despite failing to do so.
The main difference with today’s crisis is this: the populist, anti-globalist, anti-social disruption from and reaction against labor mobility. People from poorer countries are coming to richer countries and France has many immigrants from both North and Sub-Saharan Africa. The likely outcome is that somehow the social unrest stops after the government makes gestures of minimal substantive impact. Then, the system would revert to an inter-unrest period status quo, followed by stasis.
At the moment, the government can quell the unrest on the streets by enhancing security measures. It can also assuage public grievances. However, so far it has failed to do so. The one pledge the Lecornu government has made is to end Parcoursup university application procedures, which will come into effect after 2028. This pledge is practically substanceless.
The key challenge for France is that citizens refuse any change to the acquis sociaux, worker’s social rights. The country can no longer afford to pay for these rights. Without budget tightening and debt reduction, France will hurtle into a profound and prolonged economic crisis. Yet the French cannot look at reality in the face and reform. They want more from the state when the state has run out of money.
The far right and far left both are exploiting this crisis. The far right is likely to benefit, on balance, more than the far left. Will the crisis propel RN’s Le Pen to the presidency? Atul thinks it might. So far, the majority of French voters have opposed the far right but, as stated earlier, Le Pen now leads Mélenchon and we could enter a brave new world next year.
[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
”
post-content-short=”
Fair Observer’s Editor-in-Chief, Atul Singh, and FOI Senior Partner Glenn Carle, a retired CIA officer who now advises companies, governments and organizations on geopolitical risk, discuss France’s deepening political and fiscal crisis. Protesters across France are demanding stronger public…”
post_summery=”In the October 2026 episode of FO Exclusive, Atul Singh and Glenn Carle examine how French protests and mounting debt are causing a spiraling national crisis. Demands for stronger public services collide with strained finances. Precarious national public finances raise the question whether European institutions could contain a French debt crisis. As confidence erodes, the far right stands to gain ahead of the presidential election next year.”
post-date=”Nov 13, 2026″
post-title=”France Erupts in Mass Protests Yet Again” slug-data=”france-erupts-in-mass-protests-yet-again”>
France Erupts in Mass Protests Yet Again
Glenn Carle”
post_date=”November 10, 2026 08:59″
pUrl=”https://www.fairobserver.com/video/donald-trumps-dodgy-diesel-deal-with-vladimir-putin/” pid=”165215″
post-content=”
Fair Observer’s Editor-in-Chief, Atul Singh, and FOI Senior Partner Glenn Carle, a retired CIA officer who now advises companies, governments and organizations on geopolitical risk, discuss US President Donald Trump’s Russian diesel deal and the political calculations behind it. With fuel prices soaring ahead of the US midterm elections, Trump has turned to Moscow just weeks after signing legislation tightening sanctions against Russia. Atul and Glenn explore why the agreement offers limited economic relief for Americans while handing Russian President Vladimir Putin a significant victory and straining US relations with Europe.
Forget sanctions, Trump wants diesel
On September 18, Trump signed into law the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026, or the Graham Act. This law codifies the existing executive order-based Russia sanctions program, mandates new Russia sanctions and even creates new tariff authorities. Note that the Graham Act also extends the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 through 2031. In the words of global law firm Holland & Knight, “the Graham Act takes aim at non-U.S. persons and vessels involved in transport of Russian-origin energy commodities, including vessels and their owners, operators and insurers.”
Less than a month later, Trump dropped a political bombshell. On October 9, three weeks after the Graham Act signature, he announced that Russian President Vladimir Putin would sell millions of tons of diesel fuel to the United States. On October 16, Trump issued Executive Order 14436, waiving the sanctions and tariffs authorized by the Graham Act.
Before the US/Israel–Iran War began on February 28, diesel prices in the US averaged $3.75 per gallon. Before this deal, they had risen to an average of $6.32 to $6.35 per gallon. The US is a diesel exporter, but Trump’s war has triggered a global supply shock and prices have risen even in America. With the midterms due on November 3, Trump has invoked the art of the deal and conjured a rabbit out of his hat to lower diesel prices. He calculates that this should help the Republicans at the polls.
US diesel sales price (March 1994–October 2026). Via Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
Presidential discretion and American credibility
Now, why are Trump’s actions a problem? First, they illustrate, as Holland & Knight said, “a recurrent tension” between the president and Congress over “the use of and responsibility for the legal tools of economic statecraft.” In keeping with precedent, the president retains significant discretion per the law. Like prior sanctions-related legislation, the Graham Act provides the president this discretion but this diesel deal goes against the spirit of the law. There is also the Ending Importation of Russian Oil Act of 2022, which intends to do pretty much what its name suggests. Many lawyers say Trump might be too close to skirting the law.
Second, Trump’s actions undermine the credibility of the US as a reliable partner. For the last few years, the US has pushed Europe to take a harder line against Russia. In January, US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent complained that the Europeans were “still sending money to Russia for energy” and “financing the war against themselves.” Now, the US has changed tack dramatically and Putin is Trump’s new best friend.
The deal’s political, international and economic implications
Third, Atul and Glenn look at what this deal means in domestic and international political terms. They examine its economic impact for both the US and Russia. They also explain Trump’s relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin and with Russia.
Politically, the deal is a propaganda tool before the elections for Trump. He can speak of it in public and tout it as a triumph. The deal is an effort to neutralize his (and the Republican Party’s) greatest vulnerability in the midterm elections: the price of fuel. The cost of a gallon of gasoline or diesel for the average American is inordinately high and Trump wants to be seen as doing something about it.
Internationally, the deal undermines international sanctions, EU sanctions, NATO and both US–NATO, US–Europe relations. The deal demonstrates three key points:
- It liberates, even rehabilitates, Putin and Russia. It ends Russia’s isolation. This is, again, one of Trump’s objectives.
- It demonstrates Trump’s decades-long “ties with” or “affinity for” Russia.
- It demonstrates Trump’s and Putin’s preference for a US–Russia bilateral condominium (joint sovereignty) in Europe and the end of the normative, alliance-structured international order. The deal favors what critics have until now erroneously called the “Post-Yalta world” of great power rule.
Economically, the agreement is empty for the US: It will hardly fill one truck on a highway somewhere in Middle America.
- The agreed-upon amount was 300,000 tons initially, equal to slightly more than half a day’s diesel consumption in the US. The final amount is one million tons, which is supposed to come next year. That is one day’s consumption in the US.
- The agreement at full implementation — in two years or so — is projected then, possibly, to reduce the price of a gallon of diesel by roughly $0.10, perhaps $0.15. Prices since February 26, however, are up over 70%, or $2.63 per gallon: from $3.72 to $6.35.
- The agreement is significant for Russia though, because it relegitimizes Russian international trade.
For Russia, this deal is extremely consequential because 50–57% of Russia’s GDP, when one includes downstream effects, comes from petroleum exports. No less than 60–63% of Russia’s foreign exchange earnings come from the petroleum industry and 20–25% of Russia’s national budget is financed by petroleum exports.
At present, the only real purchasers of Russian oil and gas are China and India, but each will only pay with yuan or rupees, respectively. In fact, sanctions have turned Russia into a de facto Chinese economic satellite but this deal gives Russia hope of breaking the stranglehold on its economy — which is, otherwise, in a death spiral. Russia’s sovereign wealth fund is down to $45 billion, but it is all held in yuan. It cannot finance or cover expenditures even to the end of 2026. Now, Russia can access scarce dollars.
Trump’s deal is a political distraction with no economic substance for the US, but is greatly beneficial economically and politically for Russia.
[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
”
post-content-short=”
Fair Observer’s Editor-in-Chief, Atul Singh, and FOI Senior Partner Glenn Carle, a retired CIA officer who now advises companies, governments and organizations on geopolitical risk, discuss US President Donald Trump’s Russian diesel deal and the political calculations behind it. With fuel…”
post_summery=”In the October 2026 episode of FO Exclusive, Atul Singh and Glenn Carle examine US President Donald Trump’s Russian diesel deal ahead of the US midterm elections. It offers Americans little relief at the pump while undermining sanctions and straining relations with Europe. Conversely, Russian President Vladimir Putin benefits politically as Trump helps ease Russia’s global isolation.”
post-date=”Nov 10, 2026″
post-title=”Donald Trump’s Dodgy Diesel Deal With Vladimir Putin” slug-data=”donald-trumps-dodgy-diesel-deal-with-vladimir-putin”>
Donald Trump’s Dodgy Diesel Deal With Vladimir Putin
Glenn Carle”
post_date=”November 07, 2026 09:21″
pUrl=”https://www.fairobserver.com/geopolitical-philosophy/global-lightning-roundup-of-october-2026/” pid=”165190″
post-content=”
Fair Observer’s Editor-in-Chief, Atul Singh, and FOI Senior Partner Glenn Carle, a retired CIA officer who now advises companies, governments and organizations on geopolitical risk, examine October 2026’s most notable developments.
Middle East Matters
Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan have been conducting peace talks in Tehran, the capital of Iran. The Shia power of the region is speaking to the Sunni powers who have signed the Mecca Pact. Atul ironically remarks inshallah — “God willing” in Arabic — there will be peace.
The Israeli election held on October 27 has resulted in political gridlock. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has lost seats, but his Likud party is still the largest in the Knesset, the Israeli parliament. At the time of this episode’s recording, most of the votes have been counted. In a historic result, Arab-led parties were projected to win 19 of the 120 seats in the Knesset, the Israeli parliament. Gadi Eisenkot, the leader of the centrist Yashar party, and most other parties have already ruled out forming a coalition with Arab parties.
Just as Israeli politics changed after Prime Minister Menachem Begin ended three decades of Labour Party dominance in 1977, so it will change after this election. Atul and Glenn will analyze the Israeli election in detail in November after the dust has settled, but they expect rising tensions and political instability in a now highly polarized country.
Brazil and Serbia’s critical elections
Israel was not the only country to go to the polls this month. In Brazil, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva won a fourth term in office in a spectacular comeback over his right-wing challenger, Flávio Bolsonaro. Lula won 51.79% of the vote, becoming the first president to win an election after losing its first round since Brazil returned to civilian rule in 1985. Bolsonaro is the son of convicted former president Jair Bolsonaro, and has been indicted himself. He has so far refused to recognize the result and called for it to be annulled.
Lula is over 80 years old and has failed to mentor a successor. His center-left Workers’ Party is known to be corrupt and has not been a good steward of the economy. Lula has presided over a patronage economy and many Brazilians want a change. Despite his shortcomings though, Lula has many achievements to his name. Bolsa Família, a program that gives financial aid to poor Brazilian families, has been a success, and so have some other policies.
Lula’s supporters are celebrating his victory against Bolsonaro’s as a triumph of democracy against fascism. In contrast, markets are spooked. Brazilian stocks, bonds and currency crashed after Lula’s election. Brazil’s (US dollar-quoted) ETF were down 27% pre-market, 12% of which were due to currency moves.
Elsewhere, in Serbia, President Aleksandar Vučić conceded the snap parliamentary elections to a student-led protest movement. Students won 2.25 million votes, while Vučić’s ruling party got only 1.67 million. However, Vučić cannot stand for a third term. He had hoped to emulate Russian President Vladimir Putin by continuing to retain power as prime minister. For the last two years, Serbians have protested against corruption after a canopy collapsed in front of Novi Sad railway station, killing 16 people.
The Student List’s lead candidate, Ilija Srdanović, told the BBC that Serbia “will be a free state.” Inspired by Hungarian Prime Minister Péter Magyar who toppled strongman Viktor Orbán, Srdanović promises to end authoritarianism, safeguard civil liberties and curb corruption. With pro-Russia Vučić gone, European Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos has stated: “A new chapter can begin for Serbia. The door to the EU is open, and we are ready to move forward together.”
Global bond market crises
In the realm of economics, bond markets have been in trouble. The yield on ten-year US Treasuries reached 5.34%, its highest level since 2002. British 30-year gilts crossed 6%, to a 28-year high. French ten-year yields topped 5%, their highest in 24 years.
At the end of last month, US President Donald Trump hurt the bond market by renewing his call for Jerome Powell to step down from the board of governors at the Federal Reserve (Fed). Powell is the former chair and an investigation cleared him of wrongdoing over the costs of the Fed’s headquarters renovation. These are now estimated to reach $2.38 billion, far exceeding $1 billion projected in 2020.
Trump thundered on Truth Social, “If he doesn’t resign, he should be sued, at the highest level, by the United States Government, for either corruption or incompetence, both of which are completely unacceptable.” This reignited worries about the Fed’s independence.
Political upheaval in Canada and Europe
Speaking of independence, Parti Québécois won in the Quebec province of Canada for the first time since 2012. This separatist party won just 28% of the vote but got 59 out of 127 seats, five short of a majority, in the legislature. New Premier Paul St-Pierre Plamondon has promised to assert greater control over Quebec’s affairs and hold a referendum seeking independence from Canada. He has also pledged to abolish the constitutional role of the British monarch in Quebec and wants a bigger role in Canada–EU ties.
In Spain, investment fund Urbagestión evicted an 87-year-old María del Carmen Abascal from her home in Madrid. She has since died. Supporters have protested this travesty, and have particularly raised their voices over Spain’s housing crisis. Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez used the protests as a pretext to call a snap election. Note that his wife, Begoña Gómez, will face jury trial for corruption and influence peddling. Sánchez’s Socialist Party trails the conservatives in the polls.
Elsewhere in Europe, the German Federal Prosecutor’s Office announced that former spy chief August Hanning had been “arrested on suspicion of espionage, treason and obtaining classified information for a foreign power.” Hanning headed Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), the country’s foreign-intelligence service, from 1998 to 2005.
Diplomatic strains, troop withdrawals and Morocco’s first female prime minister
Israel ordered the British consulate in Jerusalem to formally end its operations. The UK has imposed sanctions on Israeli interests in the West Bank. This is mainly symbolic. The two countries have agreed that the consulate will change its status to “UK Mission” and British diplomats will continue to work there.
British relations with the US are not doing well, either. America withdrew all its B1 Lancer bombers from Fairford air-force base in the UK. Reports suggested that Iran was using operatives to hit these expensive bombers with drones. British police have arrested several men but have not yet released many details.
This month, the last American and British troops left Iraq. They had been there since 2014 to fight the Islamic State. Now, Iraq has taken on “full responsibility for its security and stability.” Atul ironically remarks, “God help us all.”
Morocco has its first female prime minister. Fatima Zahra El Mansouri’s liberal-centrist Authenticity and Modernity Party won the most seats in the recent parliamentary elections: 97 out of 395. Moroccan King Mohammed VI chose this former mayor of Marrakesh as prime minister over her party colleague, Fouzi Lekjaa, who heads the Royal Moroccan Football Federation.
Protests in India and exports from China
In India, protests have erupted against Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government over the fairness of recent and future elections. India’s Election Commission (EC) is in the news. Protesters demand the resignation of its chief. They allege that the EC deleted tens of millions of voters from the electoral rolls, putting its thumb on the scale to advantage Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). The EC claims that it was merely removing duplicate or ineligible names, not favoring the BJP.
Rahul Gandhi has emerged as the flagbearer of the protests. His great-grandfather, Jawaharlal Nehru, was prime minister. So were his grandmother and father, Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi. The scion of the former ruling dynasty of India is on the rise and has greatly weakened Modi. Assistant Editors Aliyah A. Omar and Alexandros Ouzounis explained this development in an FO Spotlight newsletter on Sunday, October 25.
India’s northern neighbor was in the news too. China’s export boom continued in September. Exports reached a record $447.18 billion in September. This 36.3% year-on-year surge means that China’s trade surplus for the first nine months of 2026 was $938 billion and is on track to beat last year’s record of $1.2 trillion. This surge in exports has occurred at the same time China is experiencing a severe downturn in domestic demand. As Atul and Glenn have pointed out, China’s real estate bust has caused a cratering of domestic demand. Youth unemployment is running high and consumer confidence is low. China now relies on exports to keep its GDP growth hovering around 4.5%.
Other countries are increasingly uneasy and want to put some restrictions on Chinese exports. They believe China subsidizes industries, lowers the cost of capital for them and keeps its currency artificially low to outcompete industries elsewhere. On October 9, China agreed to a deal with the EU to curb its exports of hybrid vehicles to avoid tariffs.
[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
”
post-content-short=”
Fair Observer’s Editor-in-Chief, Atul Singh, and FOI Senior Partner Glenn Carle, a retired CIA officer who now advises companies, governments and organizations on geopolitical risk, examine October 2026’s most notable developments.
Middle East Matters
Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and…”
post_summery=”In the October 2026 episode of FO Exclusive, Atul Singh and Glenn Carle examine the key events of the month. They cast their eye over many elections from Brazil to Serbia. Rising bond yields, Indian protests and China’s export boom are among the many issues they examine.”
post-date=”Nov 07, 2026″
post-title=”Global Lightning Roundup of October 2026″ slug-data=”global-lightning-roundup-of-october-2026″>
Global Lightning Roundup of October 2026
Jeremy Lent”
post_date=”October 27, 2026 06:47″
pUrl=”https://www.fairobserver.com/world-news/fo-talks-building-a-civilization-that-works-for-all/” pid=”165071″
post-content=”
Fair Observer’s Communications and Outreach officer, Roberta Campani, speaks with author Jeremy Lent about ecological civilization, a framework for organizing society around the flourishing of life. Drawing on systems science, history and economics, Lent challenges the assumptions that make exploitation appear inevitable. Campani asks how this vision can move beyond an appealing ideal to become a practical alternative.
Lent’s personal search becomes a civilizational question
Lent’s intellectual journey begins with the collapse of his business career. After earning a Master of Business Administration at the University of Chicago, he founded the Internet company NextCard and took it public. When his wife became seriously ill, he stepped down to care for her. The company subsequently collapsed during the burst of the dot-com bubble.
That upheaval prompted his commitment to pursue work he found truly meaningful. His search took him through cognitive science, evolutionary biology, history and spiritual practices.
The resulting book trilogy moves from humanity’s cultural search for meaning to the relationship between science and traditional wisdom. His latest book, Ecocivilization: Making a World that Works for All, asks what civilization might look like if institutions reflected the interdependence of living systems. For Lent, changing economics alone cannot resolve a crisis rooted in how people understand themselves and their relationships.
Beyond capitalism or communism
Lent defines ecological civilization as a system designed to enable all beings to thrive on a regenerating Earth. He contrasts this goal with an economic order that rewards extraction and concentrates wealth.
Its foundations, he argues, lie in a worldview that separates humans from nature and individuals from one another. Nature becomes a resource, while competition and exploitation look like common sense.
Campani identifies a central obstacle: Economic debate remains trapped between capitalism and communism. Lent traces this constraint to the triumphalism surrounding communism’s collapse, when claims that no alternative existed narrowed people’s political imagination.
His alternative begins with individual dignity and community autonomy. Smaller communities would gain greater power to determine their needs, drawing on humanity’s long experience of cooperation and shared resources. The task is to design institutions that support collaboration across communities rather than domination by markets or states.
Cooperation offers another model
Campani questions the use of evolutionary theory to justify violence and neglect. Lent argues that reducing evolution to relentless competition obscures the importance of mutually beneficial symbiosis.
Drawing on biologist Lynn Margulis, he emphasizes how cooperation helped produce biological complexity. Human beings also developed capacities to collaborate beyond immediate family groups. These capacities, he suggests, offer foundations for social organization.
Campani introduces ant colonies as an example of ecological integration. Their discussion turns to the circular economy: Instead of extracting resources, consuming products and discarding waste, production would return materials to useful cycles.
Lent envisions industry whose outputs help regenerate ecosystems. This requires redesigning production around the relationships that sustain life.
Scarcity has a history
Campani asks why fertile countries depend on distant food suppliers. Lent connects these vulnerabilities to colonial systems that displaced local agriculture and redirected production toward exports.
Colonial taxes, imposed in currencies subsistence farmers could not readily obtain, pushed people into mines and cash-crop production. In India, he points to the coexistence of devastating famines and grain exports as evidence of an economy organized around imperial interests.
Present dependencies reflect this history of “artificial scarcity.” Restoring food sovereignty therefore requires confronting inherited inequalities alongside changing agricultural practices. Campani’s gardening example underscores the contrast: Nature produces abundant seeds, while systems pursuing maximum efficiency can strip away the reserves that provide resilience.
Connecting alternatives already at work
Lent identifies existing alternatives, including Spain’s Mondragon cooperatives, cooperative networks in northern Italy and the international peasant movement La Via Campesina.
He calls such initiatives “islands of coherence.” The Ecological Civilization Coalition he founded seeks to connect them, amplify their work and encourage cooperation instead of competition for resources.
The coalition invites volunteers to join working groups, turning a broad vision into opportunities for people to contribute skills, share experience and support organizations pursuing common goals.
Lent acknowledges profound fear about the future. His hope rests on collective action within unpredictable systems. Campani suggests independent journalism can help by making these initiatives visible. They close their conversation with a practical challenge: to build connections among existing alternatives so they can influence the wider system.
[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
”
post-content-short=”
Fair Observer’s Communications and Outreach officer, Roberta Campani, speaks with author Jeremy Lent about ecological civilization, a framework for organizing society around the flourishing of life. Drawing on systems science, history and economics, Lent challenges the assumptions that make…”
post_summery=”In this episode of FO Talks, Roberta Campani and Jeremy Lent explore how an ecological civilization could organize society around cooperation, human dignity and a regenerating Earth. Lent connects today’s economic and ecological crises to a worldview of separation and colonial systems of extraction. Cooperatives, agroecology movements and other alternatives offer foundations for systemic change through collective action.”
post-date=”Oct 27, 2026″
post-title=”FO Talks: Building a Civilization That Works for All” slug-data=”fo-talks-building-a-civilization-that-works-for-all”>
FO Talks: Building a Civilization That Works for All
Jean-Daniel Ruch”
post_date=”October 25, 2026 08:26″
pUrl=”https://www.fairobserver.com/region/middle_east_north_africa/fo-talks-the-end-of-unipolar-power-how-turkiye-shapes-geopolitics/” pid=”165048″
post-content=”
Fair Observer’s Chief Strategy Officer Peter Isackson, Editorial Assistant Alexandros Ouzounis and former Swiss diplomat Jean-Daniel Ruch discuss Ankara’s growing geopolitical influence. They examine relations with Europe and Israel, Kurdish reconciliation and maritime disputes. Ruch argues that Türkiye’s geography and diplomatic flexibility strengthen its position in a multipolar world, while domestic repression limits its appeal.
Geography gives Türkiye leverage over Europe
Drawing on Robert Kaplan’s 2012 book, The Revenge of Geography: What the Map Tells Us About Coming Conflicts and the Battle Against Fate, Ruch places Türkiye among the influential powers immediately below the United States, China and Russia. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has used its location to expand influence, although significant problems remain.
EU accession negotiations opened in 2005, yet Ruch sees little prospect of membership. European governments nevertheless rely on Ankara to host refugees and restrain migration. He attributes part of their resistance to anxieties about admitting a large Muslim population.
Energy adds another source of leverage. Türkiye’s pipelines and potential overland connections between the Gulf and Europe offer alternatives to vulnerable maritime routes through Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb. For Ruch, these interests make Western cooperation with Ankara strategically necessary despite political disagreements.
Hostility does not make war inevitable
Isackson asks whether Israeli warnings about Türkiye reflect domestic political incentives rather than preparations for war. Ruch recalls longstanding commercial, tourism and intelligence connections, alongside their deterioration following the 2010 Mavi Marmara flotilla confrontation.
Türkiye’s purchase of Russian S-400 systems also damaged relations with Washington and helped its critics secure its exclusion from the F-35 program. Erdoğan’s denunciations of Israel, however, coexist with continued oil shipments through the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline.
Ruch considers direct military confrontation unlikely. Competition in Syria creates friction, but Ankara values its relationship with Washington and practices “strategic patience.” Its restrained response to Israeli strikes on Syrian military facilities demonstrates that approach.
He portrays Syrian leader Ahmed al-Sharaa as heavily dependent on Ankara. In his assessment, Washington underestimates that dependence when seeking Syrian cooperation against Hezbollah. Israel’s expanding military positions around Mount Hermon and southern Syria remain a deeper concern.
Kurdish reconciliation creates an uncertain opening
Ouzounis asks how renewed negotiations with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, affect southeastern Türkiye and northeastern Syria. Ruch emphasizes that Ankara treats the conflict primarily as a domestic security issue.
He traces restrictions on Kurdish language and culture to earlier Kemalist governments, while crediting Erdoğan’s initial years with expanding cultural rights and pursuing peace. That process collapsed amid renewed violence and Turkish concerns about Kurdish armed organizations in Syria.
The present opening rests on disarmament in exchange for amnesty, supported by imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan’s call to end armed struggle. Ruch says the momentum is positive but warns that reconciliation remains unfinished and reversible.
Kurdish voters also have divergent allegiances. Conservative religious voters support Erdoğan’s party, while others favor leftist Kurdish movements. Ruch therefore rejects treating Kurdish politics as a single bloc, and considers maritime disputes more pressing for Ankara today.
Maritime compromise requires political security
For Ouzounis, disputes with Greece involve both maritime boundaries and dangerous encounters in the air. Ruch expects NATO membership and American intervention to help contain escalation.
Unresolved exclusive economic zones and competing drilling claims present the larger diplomatic challenge. He views Türkiye’s sweeping maritime agreement with Libya partly as bargaining tactics designed to strengthen Ankara’s negotiating position.
Historical trauma, including population exchanges associated with the Treaty of Lausanne, makes compromise politically hazardous. Ruch believes an agreement requires leaders with secure mandates, credible mediation and arrangements allowing all parties to benefit from energy resources.
US President Donald Trump’s rapport with Erdoğan could help, although Washington has competing priorities. Ruch criticizes US Special Envoys Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff’s diplomatic record and sees greater potential in experienced regional representatives.
Regional power cannot erase democratic failures
Regarding Gaza, Ruch sees stalled political arrangements and insufficient humanitarian relief. He doubts that changing Israel’s leadership alone will produce Palestinian sovereignty. Türkiye’s role in Somalia also creates another arena of competition as Israel develops ties with Somaliland.
Proposals for a Palestinian administration and an international stabilization force remain blocked. Ankara’s willingness to contribute troops meets Israeli resistance. Ruch argues that progress requires sustained American pressure, while refusing to predict the outcome of Israel’s next uncertain electoral contest.
Looking ahead, he identifies Saudi Arabia, Iran and Houthi activity in the Red Sea as potential drivers of regional change. Isackson questions America’s remaining soft power; Ruch counters that its films, universities and brands retain influence, even as its ability to dictate outcomes declines.
He closes by calling Türkiye “far from a perfect democracy.” Imprisoned political figures and Ankara’s refusal to implement European Court of Human Rights rulings concerning Turkish economist Osman Kavala undermine relations with Europe. Türkiye’s geopolitical gains cannot substitute for domestic credibility.
[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
”
post-content-short=”
Fair Observer’s Chief Strategy Officer Peter Isackson, Editorial Assistant Alexandros Ouzounis and former Swiss diplomat Jean-Daniel Ruch discuss Ankara’s growing geopolitical influence. They examine relations with Europe and Israel, Kurdish reconciliation and maritime disputes. Ruch argues…”
post_summery=”In this episode of FO Talks, Peter Isackson, Alexandros Ouzounis and Jean-Daniel Ruch examine Türkiye’s growing influence in a multipolar world. Geography and strategic patience give Ankara leverage as Western powers struggle to dictate regional outcomes. Yet unresolved maritime disputes and domestic repression constrain Türkiye’s diplomatic standing and international appeal.”
post-date=”Oct 25, 2026″
post-title=”FO Talks: The End of Unipolar Power? How Türkiye Shapes Geopolitics” slug-data=”fo-talks-the-end-of-unipolar-power-how-turkiye-shapes-geopolitics”>
FO Talks: The End of Unipolar Power? How Türkiye Shapes Geopolitics
Glenn Carle”
post_date=”October 19, 2026 07:25″
pUrl=”https://www.fairobserver.com/world-news/fo-exclusive-a-space-revolution-is-imminent-are-we-ready/” pid=”164975″
post-content=”
Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh and FOI Senior Partner Glenn Carle, a retired CIA officer who now advises companies, governments and organizations on geopolitical risk, discuss the imminent revolution in space and the space economy. Reusable rockets, commercial stations and nuclear propulsion could transform access to orbit and the industries that depend on it. The consequences reach beyond exploration to agriculture, communications, manufacturing and national security.
Glenn anticipates a revolution in the use of space over the next two to ten years, comparable to the dissemination and development of electricity grids in 19th-century economies or the spread of the Internet and the cell phone. His central argument concerns the launch of a space economy: Cheaper transport could make activities commercially viable that previously remained beyond reach.
Reusable infrastructure changes the economics
The transition from expendable hardware to reusable infrastructure lies at the heart of this shift. Falcon 9 already reuses its first stage. Starship is designed to reuse both its Super Heavy booster and its upper-stage spacecraft, carrying substantially more cargo into low Earth orbit (LEO). The comparison below reproduces the approximate prices, capacities and targets used in the discussion.
Rocket vehicleStatus in the supplied late-2026 comparisonDedicated launch priceMaximum payload to LEOMinimum cost per kilogram to LEOSpaceX StarshipOperational testing; recently reached orbitApproximately $10 million, internal target100,000–150,000 kg$100–$500, targetSpaceX Falcon 9Operational; market leaderApproximately $74 million, list price22,800 kg, listed as reusableApproximately $3,250CASC Long March 5, ChinaOperationalApproximately $70 million, estimate25,000 kgApproximately $3,250Arianespace Ariane 6, ESAOperational$77 million–$115 million10,350–21,650 kg$5,300–$7,400Rocket Lab NeutronIn development; late-2026 debut targetApproximately $50 million–$55 million, target13,000 kg with downrange recoveryApproximately $3,800–$4,200Rocket Lab ElectronOperational; small-satellite launcherApproximately $7.5 million300 kg$25,000
These figures illustrate the scale of the proposed change, but payload configuration matters. Actual launch prices vary with payload and mission configuration. Using the comparison’s numbers, Starship would carry roughly four to seven times Falcon 9’s listed payload. A reduction from $3,250 to 100–500 per kilogram would make transport approximately 6.5 to 32.5 times cheaper.
Starship reached orbit and deployed 26 Starlink V3 satellites on September 28, 2026. SpaceX’s Flight 14 plan specified those payloads and identified orbital insertion, deployment, a deorbit burn and controlled reentry as its primary objectives. The flight represents progress toward an operational system, while routine recovery and reuse remain essential to the economic promise.
Glenn identifies ship-to-ship refueling and reliable recovery of both rocket stages as further milestones. SpaceX’s September 15 development update also lists a ship-to-ship propellant transfer demonstration among its remaining lunar-lander milestones.
Launch frequency matters as much as payload. The discussion envisages the following annual cadence:
Rocket vehicleCurrent cadence in the comparison, 2025–2026Near-term target, 2027–2028High-volume scenario, 2029–2030 onwardSpaceX StarshipApproximately 4–6 test flights a year50–100 flights a year300–1,000 or more flights a yearSpaceX Falcon 9Approximately 140–165 flights a year100–120 flights a year20–50 flights a year, assuming a phaseoutCASC Long March 5Approximately 5–8 flights a yearApproximately 10–15 flights a yearApproximately 15–20 flights a yearArianespace Ariane 6Approximately 4–6 flights a yearApproximately 9–12 flights a yearApproximately 12 flights a year, described as a pad limitRocket Lab NeutronNone; first launch anticipated in late 2026 or 20273–8 flights a year20–50 flights a yearRocket Lab ElectronApproximately 20–25 flights a yearApproximately 30–40 flights a yearApproximately 40–50 flights a year
Glenn expects Starship to displace much of Falcon 9’s work, while Neutron competes for medium-lift missions. Atul asks whether private American enterprise will give the US an advantage over China’s state-led model. Glenn regards Starship as a potentially decisive advantage but emphasizes the coherence, ambition and technical strength of China’s program. American commercial leadership does not automatically settle which country reaches the next lunar milestone first.
The next wave of space milestones
The period from 2027 to 2031 could bring a concentrated burst of space technology milestones. The timeline below provides a list of anticipated moments in spacecraft development.
TimingDevelopmentPrimary vehicle or technologyEconomic or operational significanceMid-2027, projectedRocket Lab Neutron debutNeutron, with a reusable first stageAdds competition in medium-lift launches and supports satellite constellation deployment2027Artemis III risk-reduction missionOrion and commercial human landing systemsTests rendezvous and docking operations in Earth orbit before a lunar landingAs early as 2028Axiom station developmentPayload Power Thermal Module and subsequent modulesBegins the revised assembly sequence and enables an independent commercial platform2028Artemis IV crewed landingSLS, Orion and a human landing systemAims to return astronauts to the lunar surface for the first time since 19722029, scheduledStarlab launchSpaceX Starship, single launchDelivers an integrated commercial station developed by Voyager and Airbus2030 onward, broader development horizonNext-generation space nuclear propulsionAdvanced nuclear electric propulsionExtends efficient deep-space transport; NASA’s initial demonstration is now targeted for late 2028
NASA lists Artemis III for 2027 and Artemis IV for early 2028, rather than the late-2028 landing in the supplied timeline. Axiom’s revised assembly plan allows independent operations as early as 2028, while Airbus identifies 2029 as Starlab’s scheduled launch year.
Commercial stations could succeed the International Space Station and support research, tourism and manufacturing. Glenn also describes the longer-term possibility of a rotating, doughnut-shaped station. Rotation could produce Earth-like artificial gravity in its inhabited outer ring, while a facility near the axis could offer a low-gravity environment for industrial work.
Such an arrangement could help address the bone loss and other health effects associated with prolonged weightlessness while preserving access to microgravity research. Glenn highlights the prospect of producing materials and electronic components under conditions difficult to reproduce on Earth. This rotating-station concept is distinct from the commercial stations presently scheduled in the timeline.
The nuclear propulsion pivot
Deep-space logistics are exploring alternatives to legacy chemical propulsion. Nuclear thermal propulsion heats propellant directly in a reactor. Nuclear electric propulsion (NEP) instead uses a reactor to generate electricity, which powers electric thrusters. The latter combines relatively low thrust with high propellant efficiency, potentially improving payload capacity and deep-space operations.
The joint DARPA/NASA DRACO project originally targeted a nuclear thermal demonstration as soon as 2027. Glenn argues that falling launch costs alter the economics of deep-space systems and strengthen the case for nuclear electric propulsion.
The development outlook in the discussion envisions 10–500 kW reactor systems, ground testing through 2028 and initial flights around 2030. NASA’s current concrete milestone is earlier: Space Reactor-1 Freedom targets launch in late 2028 and arrival at Mars in 2029. It intends to demonstrate NEP and deliver SkyFall, a payload of three Mars helicopters.
Glenn connects improved propulsion to faster, more sustainable routes to Mars. The eventual travel time will depend on reactor power, spacecraft mass, trajectory and mission design.
Scheduled lunar landings
Between 2027 and 2029, lunar missions could begin laying the foundations of an industrial presence. NASA’s Artemis IV landing is one part of that process. Commercial companies, including Intuitive Machines, Blue Origin and Firefly Aerospace, are also developing robotic deliveries that could support surface science, communications and future power infrastructure.
NASA has awarded Intuitive Machines a south-pole delivery targeted for 2027 and Firefly a mission targeted for 2029. Further awards announced in July 2026 cover four missions intended for late 2028.
Lunar ice processing is a potential first step toward using resources beyond Earth. Water could support crews and, after processing, provide ingredients for propellant.
The space economy reaches beyond space hardware
The regional comparison used in the discussion illustrates the scale of government and commercial participation:
RegionGovernment space budget onlyTotal space economy footprint, commercial and governmentUnited StatesApproximately $77 billion, federal civil and defense spendingApproximately 128 billion–142 billion; the supplied comparison associates this with roughly 38% of the global marketChinaApproximately $19 billion, official or estimatedApproximately $350 billion, or 2.5 trillion yuan, including a broad commercial and state-backed ecosystemEuropeApproximately $11.4 billion, or €9.5 billion, for ESA and national civil and defense activityApproximately 50 billion–70 billion for the regional upstream and downstream ecosystem
The $77 billion US government figure is supported by the Space Foundation’s report for 2024. The regional totals should not be read as comparable shares of one global total: 128 billion–142 billion is not 38% of a $626 billion economy. China’s $350 billion figure reflects a broadly defined commercial-space market estimate.
The trillion-dollar outlook is supported by major industry forecasts, although definitions and growth assumptions differ. Novaspace estimates a $626.4 billion space economy in 2025 and projects $1.01 trillion by 2034, with a 5.5% compound annual growth rate. The 12% rate attached to those endpoints in the discussion does not match the underlying forecast. Space Foundation reports $613 billion for 2024, with commercial activity accounting for 78%.
Glenn discusses a 2035 outlook of approximately $1.15 trillion, potentially reaching $1.9 trillion. A World Economic Forum and McKinsey forecast projects $1.8 trillion by 2035, including the broader value of space-enabled services.
What will this economy do? Much of its value will come from terrestrial applications: precision agriculture, AI-driven climate and disaster logistics, global supply-chain tracking and direct-to-cell telecommunications. Defense demand will also expand through missile tracking, communications, observation and rapid deployment capabilities.
In-space industry adds another layer, including orbital propellant depots, private station tourism and microgravity pharmaceutical manufacturing. Lunar resource processing could follow, with asteroid mining a more distant prospect. Cheaper launches widen the range of activities that companies can attempt.
For Atul and Glenn, the stakes extend to economies, governments and militaries. A transport system capable of moving far larger payloads at much lower cost could turn space infrastructure into an increasingly routine part of life on Earth. The decisive shift they see is from exceptional missions to sustained economic activity.
[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
”
post-content-short=”
Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh and FOI Senior Partner Glenn Carle, a retired CIA officer who now advises companies, governments and organizations on geopolitical risk, discuss the imminent revolution in space and the space economy. Reusable rockets, commercial stations and nuclear propulsion could…”
post_summery=”In the September 2026 episode of FO Exclusive, Atul Singh and Glenn Carle examine how reusable rockets and falling launch costs could transform the space economy. Commercial stations, lunar infrastructure and nuclear electric propulsion could expand manufacturing and exploration beyond Planet Earth. The greatest economic effects may emerge on earth though through improved communications, agriculture, disaster response and defense capabilities.”
post-date=”Oct 19, 2026″
post-title=”FO Exclusive: A Space Revolution Is Imminent — Are We Ready?” slug-data=”fo-exclusive-a-space-revolution-is-imminent-are-we-ready”>
FO Exclusive: A Space Revolution Is Imminent — Are We Ready?
Glenn Carle”
post_date=”October 18, 2026 05:39″
pUrl=”https://www.fairobserver.com/world-news/us-news/fo-exclusive-canada-breaks-up-with-the-us-and-flirts-with-the-eu/” pid=”164945″
post-content=”
Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh and FOI Senior Partner Glenn Carle, a retired CIA officer who now advises companies, governments and organizations on geopolitical risk, discuss the growing breach between Canada and the United States. US President Donald Trump’s protectionist policies have prompted Canadian retaliation and encouraged Ottawa to pursue closer ties with Europe. Atul and Glenn explore whether this signals a lasting historic shift, even as Canada struggles to escape the economic pull of its southern neighbor.
Since returning to the White House in January 2025, Trump has implemented aggressive protectionist policies, aiming to pull manufacturing back to the US and address trade deficits. Has it worked? No. Manufacturing as a percentage of the economy declined through 2025 and early 2026 before recovering to 9.7% in the second quarter, the same share as in late 2024. The US goods trade deficit rose in 2025, although the combined goods-and-services deficit edged down.
2025: Initial escalations and legal hurdles
Broad tariffs and Canadian countermeasures
On February 1, 2025, the US administration announced broad protectionist measures, initially setting a 25% tariff on most Canadian imports and 10% on energy. Following a postponement, these tariffs took effect on March 4. Canada responded with countertariffs. From March 7, USMCA-compliant goods received an exemption, while the tariff on noncompliant potash fell from 25% to 10%.
During spring 2025, tariffs on specific sectors shifted dynamically. Steel and aluminum duties jumped to 50% on June 4, while automotive products and other goods faced additional US duties through the year. Lumber also became a target of sectoral tariffs later in 2025.
The Supreme Court limits emergency tariff powers
On February 20, 2026, the US Supreme Court ruled that the 1977 International Emergency Economic Powers Act did not authorize the president to impose tariffs. It invalidated the emergency-law basis for the initial sweeping duties, rather than striking down the law’s emergency powers generally.
The Trump administration quickly pivoted toward alternative duties under Section 122 of the 1974 Trade Act. Sectoral tariffs imposed under Section 232 of the 1962 Trade Expansion Act, including those on metals, remained in place. The legal setback changed Washington’s instruments without ending its protectionist approach.
Mid-2026: Breakdown in talks and severe escalation
Washington declines to extend its own agreement
On July 1, 2026, the first six-year joint review of the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA) took place. The US declined to extend the agreement for a new 16-year term, shifting the framework to mandatory annual reviews. The agreement remains in force and is scheduled to expire in 2036 unless the three countries agree to extend it.
For Atul and Glenn, the irony is clear. Trump is rejecting the continuation of the agreement he insisted on negotiating and touted as an exceptional trade deal. Glenn views this as a repudiation of Trump’s own achievement. Atul connects it to Trump’s habit of reopening commitments in pursuit of a supposedly better deal.
Section 338 brings 50% tariffs
On July 20, citing discriminatory treatment, Trump signed proclamations under Section 338 of the 1930 Tariff Act to impose 50% tariffs on a wide variety of Canadian goods. The measures responded to disputes involving vehicles, alcohol and dairy, but covered a broader range of products and provided no exemption for goods qualifying for USMCA preferential treatment.
On August 22, following a brief three-day suspension for last-ditch negotiations, the 50% American tariffs officially took effect after bilateral talks collapsed. Their original August 19 start date had been postponed by a proclamation issued on August 18.
Fall 2026: Retaliation and import bans
Canada targets American political pressure points
On September 8, Canada fired back with major dollar-for-dollar countertariffs ranging from 15% to 50% on approximately C$27.6 billion ($19.44 billion) worth of US exports. The measures affected sectors including steel, appliances, electronics, agricultural equipment, dairy and pulp and paper. Provincial restrictions on US alcohol added another source of pressure.
Atul interprets Canada’s approach as strategic targeting of local businesses, farmers and manufacturers where it hurts. The Canadian goal, he assesses, is to get Americans to lobby their legislators to put pressure on the White House.
Illinois faces pressure through agricultural and construction equipment, including sectors associated with John Deere. Pennsylvania’s large-engine motorcycle industry, including Harley-Davidson production, represents another pressure point in a crucial electoral state. Ohio and Michigan face countermeasures affecting steel, machinery and manufactured goods. Iowa’s agricultural machinery and Maine’s forest products offer further opportunities to generate local economic friction.
Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney’s background helps explain this combination of political calculation and economic pressure. A former governor of both the Bank of Canada and the Bank of England, he understands numbers. Carney played ice hockey for Harvard and did his PhD in economics at Oxford. He is clearly a sharp chap who has sharp elbows as well.
Washington escalates beyond duties
On September 29, US import bans took effect on nearly $1 billion worth of select Canadian products, specifically alcoholic beverages, certain motorcycles and dairy derivatives such as whey. Washington announced the restrictions on September 8, distinguishing the announcement from their implementation three weeks later.
The restrictions deepen a dispute that now extends beyond tariff rates to whether some Canadian products can enter the American market at all.
Canada turns toward Europe
Carney calls for solidarity among intermediate powers
On January 20, 2026, Carney gave a speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, on the rupture in the world order. He called for solidarity among intermediate powers, arguing that cooperation could help countries preserve sovereignty when great powers used economic integration as a weapon.
Atul connects this argument to Dutch-born investor Antoine van Agtmael, known for introducing the term emerging markets. He points out that van Agtmael is now advocating a third pole: intermediate powers coming together to create another center of power in addition to the US and China.
The EU proposes associate membership
On September 16, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen invited Canada to work toward becoming the EU’s first associate member. The proposal did not establish membership or a defined new legal status. Neither side had yet settled what the arrangement would mean, and its realization would require agreement beyond the Commission president’s announcement.
On September 17, Carney welcomed the ambition in a speech to the European Parliament in Strasbourg, France. He called for closer cooperation on defense, critical minerals and energy security. Canada has resources and commodities it can share with the EU, while Europe offers advanced manufacturing, processing capabilities and clean energy technology.
Trump called the idea “laughable” and threatened “very serious tariffs” on Europe if the EU moved forward with its Canada plan. He considered the initiative a hostile act. The prospect of closer Canada–EU ties has now become another point of transatlantic tension between the US and Europe.
Escaping America’s economic gravity
Infrastructure limits Canada’s options
Glenn considers Canada’s efforts rational, but emphasizes the practical constraints. In his analogy, the US is Planet Earth and Canada is but a small satellite orbiting around the planet. Escaping American gravity is exceptionally difficult for Canada.
Importantly, Canada lacks the processing and port facilities needed to redirect energy exports toward Europe on a substantially larger scale. Glenn estimates that building the necessary infrastructure would require at least a decade of concerted national effort. Closer European ties, therefore, cannot rapidly detach Canada from the American economy. Geography, infrastructure and deeply integrated commercial relationships limit how far and how fast Ottawa can move.
A historic shift with political risks
Even so, Glenn sees the possibility of a lasting historic shift in effort and trajectory. He compares closer Canada–EU ties to China’s growing influence in the Middle East. American missteps have created openings for other powers without immediately eliminating American dominance.
Trump’s pressure on Canada may encourage a slow structural realignment as in the Middle East. For Glenn, this is a needless rupture that harms all concerned and weakens longstanding Western cooperation.
Atul also acknowledges the flies in the ointment. Carney’s critics point to Europe’s own crises and the rise of the far right, which could threaten EU cohesion. Prolonged economic pain in Canada could also undermine Carney’s political future.
Carney’s supporters counter that a country facing a bully cannot constantly take the pressure lying down. Pushing back may improve the chances of obtaining a better deal, while repeated submission would only invite further demands from Trump.
Atul suggests that Canada’s drift toward Europe could be an embryonic form of a third pole, a loose grouping capable of resisting domination by the US and China. Carney himself explicitly rejected the idea of building a third bloc to become another great-power rival. His stated objective is collective resilience: enough strength and diversity of partnerships to prevent others from dictating Canada’s choices.
[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
”
post-content-short=”
Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh and FOI Senior Partner Glenn Carle, a retired CIA officer who now advises companies, governments and organizations on geopolitical risk, discuss the growing breach between Canada and the United States. US President Donald Trump’s protectionist policies have prompted…”
post_summery=”In the September 2026 episode of FO Exclusive, Atul Singh and Glenn Carle examine how US President Donald Trump’s escalating trade war is pushing Canada toward retaliation and closer European ties. Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney’s response seeks to defend Canadian sovereignty, but geography and infrastructure constrain Ottawa’s ability to escape American economic dominance. The dispute could reshape longstanding Western partnerships.”
post-date=”Oct 18, 2026″
post-title=”FO Exclusive: Canada Breaks up With the US and Flirts With the EU” slug-data=”fo-exclusive-canada-breaks-up-with-the-us-and-flirts-with-the-eu”>
FO Exclusive: Canada Breaks up With the US and Flirts With the EU
Glenn Carle”
post_date=”October 17, 2026 05:45″
pUrl=”https://www.fairobserver.com/region/middle_east_north_africa/fo-exclusive-can-crown-prince-mbs-survive-saudi-arabias-emerging-geopolitical-crisis/” pid=”164938″
post-content=”
Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh and FOI Senior Partner Glenn Carle, a retired CIA officer who now advises companies, governments and organizations on geopolitical risk, examine the pressures facing Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) and the House of Saud. Atul draws on FOI’s military, diplomatic and intelligence sources to explain how these pressures could threaten the monarchy. Glenn shares many of his concerns but offers a different assessment of the Kingdom’s resilience.
Houthi advances change the strategic reality
Houthi attacks and advances demonstrate the limits of Saudi military might, putting unprecedented pressure on the kingdom and the current regime. To the east, the Iranians have blocked the Strait of Hormuz and severely disrupted Saudi exports. To the southwest, Houthis threaten to choke off the Bab al-Mandab, the strait connecting the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. Drone and missile attacks on Saudi infrastructure have greatly damaged critical oil, port and pipeline facilities, causing a significant shortfall in revenues.
Houthi advances change the strategic reality of the Arabian Peninsula. In September 2026, the Houthis captured significant parts of Yemen’s Red Sea coast and several strategic islands. They began their offensive on September 3 and made rapid advances. They captured the city and port of Mokha on September 10 and Perim, also known as Mayyun, in the Bab al-Mandab Strait on September 11.
They also fought for control of key passes in the Kahboub Mountains, rugged highlands in the Lahj and Taiz governorates. Commanding these highlands, some of whose heights lie about 40 kilometers from Bab al-Mandab, secures the rear of Houthi-controlled territory on the coast. Reporting on September 22 described continuing battles for the mountain range, rather than confirmed control of the entire area.
The Houthis now have the ability to threaten passage through the strait more directly, though according to Atul, they have promised not to target European or American ships for now. In contrast, they have formally announced a ban on Saudi-flagged, owned or operated vessels, as well as any shipping moving to or from Saudi Red Sea ports such as Yanbu and Jeddah. Their island positions improve their ability to observe passing vessels and reduce the warning time available before an attack.
Saudi Arabia faces unattractive choices in Yemen
FOI’s sources say Saudi Arabia increasingly faces an impossible situation. The Houthis want the Saudis to pay salaries in Houthi-controlled territory, share Yemen’s oil revenues and compensate for war losses. MBS would lose face if he gives in to this extortion racket. In 2015, he intervened in Yemen’s civil war to restore the Yemeni government but got bogged down in protracted conflict that led to a truce in 2022. The Saudi-led intervention began on March 26, 2015 and MBS failed to achieve victory, accepting a UN-brokered truce that took effect on April 2, 2022.
The relative calm that followed that truce has now broken down. MBS could choose military escalation but that would lead to more Houthi strikes on Saudi energy infrastructure. Neither giving in to extortion nor choosing escalation are attractive options.
FOI’s sources also argue that Saudi Arabia’s diplomatic blunders have led to humiliation in Yemen. The Yemenis backed by MBS have proved to be divided, corrupt and incompetent in their assessment. MBS has fallen out with UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed (MBZ). Initially, MBS and MBZ intervened together against the Houthis in 2015. Now, they have become rivals.
The UAE backs the Southern Transitional Council (STC), a separatist group pushing for southern Yemeni autonomy. The Saudis back the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) that operates largely out of Riyadh and stands for a united Yemen. Though the PLC is internationally recognized, it commands no effective authority and Yemen has become a fractured, failed state with shifting tribal loyalties and competing regional militias. These sources hold MBS responsible for the Saudi humiliation in Yemen.
Saudi troubles stem not only from the Houthis and Iranian attacks but also Shia militants in Iraq. Their attack forced the closure of a key pipeline. Drone attacks that Riyadh blamed on Iraqi militias forced the East-West pipeline to shut on September 11, interrupting crude loading at the eastern Saudi port of Yanbu. Operations subsequently resumed. Note that the East-West pipeline carries oil across Saudi Arabia to the Red Sea, providing an alternative export route to Hormuz. That alternative route faces twin threats: the Houthis to the south and the Iraqi Shia militias to the north.
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has been active in Iraq for the last two decades and the IRGC-backed Shia militias are engaging in asymmetric warfare across Saudi Arabia’s northern border. Riyadh worries about attacks on Eastern Province, which holds an estimated 70%–90% of Saudi oil reserves. Both Ghawar, the world’s largest conventional onshore oil field, and Safaniya, the world’s largest offshore oil field, are in this province.
Shias form an estimated 25%–33% of the population in the province. Riyadh has persecuted these Shias for decades, some of whom are bound to have sympathies with Iran. With local Shia help, Iran and IRGC-backed Iraqi militias can cause significant damage to energy facilities, especially the Abqaiq processing facility that processes 50%–70% of the total Saudi oil output.
A fragmented military protects the dynasty
FOI’s military sources also express grave doubts about the command structure of the Saudi military as well as the quality of officers and troops. Per Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Saudi Arabia’s military expenditure was an estimated $83.2 billion in 2025.
Despite spending this money, FOI’s sources doubt the military’s combat readiness. Saudi Arabia has some of the best Western hardware and the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) is regarded by these sources as the best in the Arab world. However, Saudi forces other than RSAF do not have a high reputation.
Atul’s approximate personnel estimates put the regular military at the Royal Saudi Land Forces (~75,000), the RSAF (~20,000), the Royal Saudi Air Defense Forces (~16,000), the Royal Saudi Naval Forces (~13,500) and the Strategic Missile Forces (~2,500). FOI’s sources contend that forces other than RSAF cannot maintain their military equipment, lack combat experience, lack professionalism and cannot take casualties.
The House of Saud has long feared a coup and created loyal forces to counter Saudi regular forces. Atul points to military seizures of power in Egypt, Syria and Iraq as examples of the outcomes Saudi rulers wanted to prevent.
An approximately 130,000-strong Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG) counterbalances the 127,000 regular forces. The purpose of SANG, known as the White Army, is the perpetuation of the House of Saud. Tribal loyalties matter. Financial retainers, patronage and family integration bind local sheikhs and tribes to the monarchy. SANG has mechanized infantry, armored vehicles, artillery and aviation to ensure that it is not dependent on regular forces.
The Saudis also have the Royal Guard Regiment to protect the monarch and the palaces. Members of this Praetorian guard have deep tribal and familial loyalty to the Al Saud dynasty. The Royal Guards and SANG keep the Saudi regular forces in check to ensure the continuation of the regime.
FOI’s sources explain that the fragmented Saudi forces cannot guarantee the country’s security anymore. They mention two factors as particularly debilitating. Top-down centralization has led to bureaucratization, suboptimal feedback loops and poor decision-making. Different Saudi forces operate separate intelligence, supply and communication lines, making coordination difficult and undermining combat effectiveness. Critics call Saudi forces a “checkbook military” that can buy expensive military kit but cannot maintain or operate what they buy. Saudi forces reportedly have “all the gear, no idea.”
Asymmetric warfare tests the American security umbrella
FOI assesses that Saudi Arabia is not in a position to counter the asymmetric warfare unleashed by Iran and its proxies. Atul puts the cost of Saudi air defenses’ MIM-104 Patriot interceptors at $3–$4 million per missile when used to intercept low-cost Iranian-designed loitering munitions costing less than $20,000. Interceptor missiles are both expensive and scarce.
Saudi soft targets such as water desalination plants, energy processing facilities, oil terminals and pipelines are particularly vulnerable to low-cost, low-flying Iranian drones. From 2015 to 2021, the Houthis launched 430 ballistic missiles and 851 armed drones on Saudi targets.
On September 14, 2019, low-altitude cruise missiles and suicide drones struck Saudi Aramco’s oil processing facilities at Abqaiq and Khurais. Saudi Arabia attributed the attack to Iran, while the Houthis claimed responsibility. The strike knocked out 5.7 million barrels per day, about 50% of the total Saudi oil production and 5% of the global supply. Aramco confirmed the suspension of 5.7 million barrels of daily production that day.
FOI sources in Washington reveal that the Trump administration does not want to guarantee Saudi security, leaving the country extremely vulnerable. US President Donald Trump wants Saudi forces to buy American-manufactured military hardware and take on Iran. His administration would like Saudi Arabia to become a self-reliant fortress that becomes an economic engine for American defense manufacturing.
So far, the Saudis have relied on the American security architecture but according to FOI’s sources, the US has moved assets and operations out of its bases in the Persian Gulf because of targeted and sustained Iranian attacks. With American security increasingly uncertain, the Saudis are looking for alternatives.
On August 7, 2026, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan signed the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement, creating what Atul describes as a Sunni coalition against Shia Iran. During the period discussed, neither Turkey nor Pakistan had stepped in to counter Iran and its proxies directly. On September 24, the three countries’ foreign ministers discussed arrangements for an urgent meeting of their chiefs of staff.
The Saudi social contract comes under strain
FOI’s diplomatic sources in London believe that Saudi military vulnerability could lead to the downfall of MBSl. The ambitious crown prince has centralized power in his hands, shaking down members of his family, undermining traditional tribal authority and marginalizing the kingdom’s religious establishment. Tribal and religious leaders oppose top-down Westernization and wasteful mega projects, according to these sources.
Key southwestern confederations such as the Khawlan bin ‘Amr, Yam and Qahtan were loyal to the Al Saud family for decades. MBS stripped them of their financial stipends and tribal autonomy. FOI’s sources report that these tribes have not only rejected the demands of the Saudi palace but also actively enabled the Houthis. Atul describes their conduct as a refusal to cooperate fully with the palace.
MBS has been turning his security apparatus against these non-cooperative tribes. That poses a risk because many SANG troops hail from these very tribes and could mutiny.
FOI’s sources think that the Saudi social contract no longer works. Historically, the House of Saud has distributed oil rents in exchange for political allegiance. These rents have flowed through tribal and religious leaders.
In 2025, oil revenues accounted for 54.55% of total government income according to the Ministry of Finance. Reported figures put oil revenue at 606.54 billion ($161.74 billion) out of total revenue of approximately 1.11 trillion ($295.53 billion). Economists estimated this figure to be higher. Iran has severely threatened the export earnings underpinning Saudi state revenue. The 2025 budget deficit reached approximately 276.61 billion ($73.69 billion). With earnings down and spending up, Saudi Arabia faces significant financial strain and MBS has less money to buy allegiance.
FOI’s sources in the region report that alienated tribal leaders, angry traditional Muslim clerics and demoralized mid-level military officers might collaborate with rival royals and business elites MBS purged and humiliated to get rid of the crown prince. With uncertain external support, internal opposition from powerful groups and cashflow problems, the survival of not only MBS but the House of Saud itself is now in question.
Glenn expects resilience rather than collapse
Glenn agrees that these pressures are real but argues that Saudi rulers have faced several challenges for decades. Yemen has long presented a security challenge, while factional rivalries and tensions involving the Shia minority predate MBS. Fighting a movement rooted in local society, operating in difficult terrain and receiving Iranian support would challenge even a much stronger military. So, the Saudis deserve some slack for their military debacle.
Glenn views MBS’s achievements in centralizing power, streamlining authority around himself and weakening conservative religious leaders as a success and a source of strength. Many young Saudis support the crown prince because he has expanded entertainment and brought substantial changes to everyday life. Cristiano Ronaldo’s presence in Saudi football provides one conspicuous example.
For Glenn, the two largest strategic dangers are a less dependable American security commitment and the economic consequences of disrupted petroleum exports. Without those earnings, MBS’s social, military and political projects could face existential pressure. Nevertheless, Glenn expects the monarchy to muddle through rather than suffer a sudden collapse.
Atul maintains that MBS has spent excessively on prestige projects without sufficiently improving productivity. Popularity among young Saudis may not offset opposition from powerful groups with greater organization and ability to use force. If falling oil income reduces the resources available for patronage, MBS’s popularity could fall quickly.
Glenn closes by pointing to Saudi Arabia’s substantial sovereign wealth assets. He cites Saudi sovereign wealth of roughly $1 trillion. Note that the Public Investment Fund’s 2025 reporting confirms more than $900 billion in assets under management. These assets provide a financial cushion for a beleaguered MBS, even if they are not all immediately available cash. Atul accepts the point and acknowledges efforts to restructure major development projects and build capacity. However, he doubts if Saudi assets and efforts can offset military and financial pressures now testing MBS and his dynasty.
[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
”
post-content-short=”
Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh and FOI Senior Partner Glenn Carle, a retired CIA officer who now advises companies, governments and organizations on geopolitical risk, examine the pressures facing Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) and the House of Saud. Atul draws on FOI’s military,…”
post_summery=”In the September 2026 episode of FO Exclusive, Atul Singh and Glenn Carle discuss whether military vulnerabilities, disrupted oil exports and elite resentment threaten Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) and the House of Saud. Atul thinks that dwindling revenues and fractured loyalties could destabilize the monarchy. Glenn expects greater resilience of the dynasty because of centralized power, support for MBS among young Saudis and substantial sovereign wealth assets.”
post-date=”Oct 17, 2026″
post-title=”FO Exclusive: Can Crown Prince MBS Survive Saudi Arabia’s Emerging Geopolitical Crisis?” slug-data=”fo-exclusive-can-crown-prince-mbs-survive-saudi-arabias-emerging-geopolitical-crisis”>
FO Exclusive: Can Crown Prince MBS Survive Saudi Arabia’s Emerging Geopolitical Crisis?
Glenn Carle”
post_date=”October 16, 2026 07:00″
pUrl=”https://www.fairobserver.com/world-news/fo-exclusive-global-lightning-roundup-of-september-2026/” pid=”164909″
post-content=”
Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh and FOI Senior Partner Glenn Carle, a retired CIA officer who now advises companies, governments and organizations on geopolitical risk, examine September 2026’s most notable developments.
They go through the key developments of the month before they dive into their three major issues for the month: Saudi Arabia’s Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) troubles, Canada turning to the EU amidst a trade war with the US and the space race.
Two summits, neither quite victorious
On September 23–25, US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping met for an important summit. We have strategic stability for now. China’s primary political gathering in 2027 will be the 21st National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, scheduled for the autumn of 2027 in Beijing. Xi wants stability until then. Midterms are around the corner in the US. So, Trump wants stability too. Trump has delayed a $14 billion arms package for Taiwan. No agreement on AI, and none is likely to come either. In addition, Trump has delayed a $14 billion arms package for Taiwan even though the package had already been awaiting approval for months.
On September 22, the US, Denmark and Greenland signed a deal. The US now has guaranteed, long-term access, basing, and overflight rights. It excludes Russia and China from operating in Greenland. The Trump administration congratulated itself for “executing a master move of geopolitical chess in the Great Arctic Game” and following the Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine to a “T.”
Glenn is not convinced, though. He argues that, like the Trump–Xi summit, the Greenland deal really didn’t change anything. The Danes simply repackaged the status quo in a pretty enough package to allow Trump to claim another victory.
Iran war causes economic pain and political trouble in Europe
Unfortunately, Trump can only claim victory over Greenland. The US/Israel–Iran War is causing global economic pain. As FOI Geopolitical Risk Monitor predicted on May 12, the supply shock has led to massive inflationary pressures.
Central banks are having to react, while governments are running up against the narrowed financial straits caused by long-term structural deficits and debt among the US and Europe. The European Central Bank raised interest rates for the second time this year, lifting its deposit facility from 2.25% to 2.5%. The Federal Reserve (Fed) raised interest rates by 0.25 percentage points (25 basis points) during the third quarter. The Fed has moved the benchmark federal funds rate to a target range of 3.75% to 4.00%, hiking rates for the first time since July 2023.
Political trouble is accompanying economic pain in Europe. The rise of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) has weakened German Chancellor Friedrich Merz and caused panic. The far-right party secured a historic first-place finish in the eastern state of Saxony-Anhalt with 43.8% of the vote in the September 6 election. It followed up its Saxony-Anhalt breakthrough by winning the northeastern coastal state of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania with 38.2% of the vote on September 20.
Indeed, the ascent of the far right, or at least the rise of populist leaders, continues across Europe and the US. Deputy of the French National Assembly Marine Le Pen is leading in presidential polls for the 2027 presidential election. An Ipsos-BVA poll published by Le Monde placed her ahead in all tested first-round scenarios, despite her being a convicted felon. But then, if one wishes to evaluate the effects of criminality on political success, one need only look to the White House, where a man convicted of 34 felonies, and indicted for yet more, sits in the recently-gilded Oval Office.
On September 28, Swedish Social Democrats leader Magdalena Andersson said she was unable to secure enough support despite the center-left bloc winning a narrow majority in the September 13 election. Glenn posits that the global phenomenon driving this political shift is a dramatic social transformation stemming from increased immigration. The mass migration of people has led to divided and destabilized societies.
Serbia, Iceland and Russia–North Korea in the news
On September 7, thousands attended the funeral of Ratko Mladić, a Bosnian-Serb commander, in Belgrade, the capital of Serbia. He died in a UN hospital on August 27 while serving a life sentence. The fact that so many showed up is worrying. Mladić was convicted of overseeing the 1995 massacre at Srebrenica and conducting the 1992–1996 Siege of Sarajevo. These attacks killed 8,000 Bosnian men and boys and an estimated 11, 540 people, respectively.
Iceland voters rejected resuming EU accession negotiations by roughly 53%–47%. The referendum took place on August 29, with final results formally announced on September 22. Turnout was nearly 83%, and only the capital Reykjavik voted in favor.
On September 7, Russia and North Korea opened their first cross-border road link in the form of a bridge spanning the Tumen River. The bridge runs around 200 kilometers (125 miles) from Vladivostok, which is Russia’s main port on the Pacific Ocean.
China in Egypt and America in Venezuela
Before traveling to the US, Xi visited Egypt. During his September 2 meeting with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, he called for a new security apparatus for the Middle East. Importantly, he said that China was ready to help protect strategic shipping routes in the region. Atul and Glenn’s two takeaways are as follows: “China’s influence in the Middle East is on the rise, and Egypt’s international partnerships amid regional turmoil in the Middle East are growing.”
Elsewhere, on September 2, the energy corporation Chevron promised to invest $7 billion and double oil production in Venezuela. Nicolás Maduro, the former president, is now in an American prison. The US has undermined Russian and Chinese influence in Caracas — Interim President Delcy Rodríguez is proving a good accomplice to Washington, DC. Opposition leader María Corina Machado is unhappy and says Venezuelans are feeling “sadness, anger and unease,” but she has no power.
Importantly, the Pentagon will take a 35% stake in a Venezuelan oil company. This is a success for the Donroe Doctrine, and an example of smash-and-grab FOI predicted last year. Perhaps, Glenn says with some irony, with the US military owning businesses now, this represents America’s newfound love of socialism and the emulation of the Chinese model of economic “development.”
Military upheaval in the US and China, and turmoil in American tech giants
The US military is going through upheaval. On September 1, Daniel Driscoll resigned as secretary of the army after clashing with Secretary of Defense/War Pete Hegseth over the sacking of senior commanders. Back in April, Hegseth fired several top-ranking officers, including General Randy George as army chief of staff.
Turmoil in the military is not limited to changes in the top leadership. After a record 286 consecutive days at sea, the USS Abraham Lincoln docked at Laem Chabang in Thailand. Pictures showed it was not in pristine shape by the end of its voyage and morale was reportedly running low.
A consolation for the US is that China is also experiencing military turmoil. On September 21, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) expelled Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli, two generals, from the party and the armed forces for alleged disloyalty and corruption. They had been under investigation since January. This makes 158 senior military leaders that have either been expelled, imprisoned or disappeared in Xi’s various purges.
Finally, America’s tech giants were in the news this month. On September 2, Uber announced that it was cutting 3,300 people, about 10% of its global workforce, mostly in management. The company is going through a major restructuring. Uber was not the only company that attracted attention. On August 31, the Federal Trade Commission and 22 states filed a lawsuit against Amazon. They claim the company secretly rigged ad auctions on its site and app, illegally taking $20 billion from 1.2 million advertisers. Amazon denies the claims, calling the lawsuit misguided. Time will tell who prevails in this titanic legal battle.
[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
”
post-content-short=”
Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh and FOI Senior Partner Glenn Carle, a retired CIA officer who now advises companies, governments and organizations on geopolitical risk, examine September 2026’s most notable developments.
They go through the key developments of the month before they dive into…”
post_summery=”In the September 2026 episode of FO Exclusive, Atul Singh and Glenn Carle examine September’s key developments, from the Trump–Xi summit to the US–Denmark agreement over Greenland. They note how central banks have raised interest rates because of inflation triggered by the US/Israel–Iran War. They also cover political turmoil in Europe, geopolitical moves by and military purges in the US and China, and firings and lawsuits in big tech.”
post-date=”Oct 16, 2026″
post-title=”FO Exclusive: Global Lightning Roundup of September 2026″ slug-data=”fo-exclusive-global-lightning-roundup-of-september-2026″>
FO Exclusive: Global Lightning Roundup of September 2026
Jean-Daniel Ruch”
post_date=”October 08, 2026 06:23″
pUrl=”https://www.fairobserver.com/video/fo-talks-does-this-mean-the-end-for-switzerlands-neutrality/” pid=”164808″
post-content=”
Fair Observer’s Communications and Outreach officer, Roberta Campani, speaks with former Swiss diplomat Jean-Daniel Ruch about Switzerland’s rejection of the Neutrality Initiative. Ruch interprets the result as resistance to a stricter definition of neutrality, rather than abandonment of the principle. They examine sanctions against Russia, closer cooperation with NATO, controversial weapons purchases and the relationship between national independence and freedom of expression.
Voters reject rigidity, not neutrality
Switzerland’s direct democracy allows citizens to propose constitutional amendments by collecting 100,000 signatures. Adoption requires both a nationwide popular majority and a majority of cantonal votes. Only about 8% of popular initiatives have succeeded since the system began in 1891.
The neutrality proposal lost by approximately 70%–30%. Every canton rejected it, although Ticino’s result was narrow. Ruch contrasts that defeat with continuing public support for neutrality, which he places above 80%.
The initiative sought to restrict cooperation with military alliances, prohibit sanctions against belligerents unless authorized by the UN Security Council and strengthen Switzerland’s mediation role. Its rejection leaves policymakers greater flexibility over sanctions and NATO relations.
Ruch credits direct democracy with encouraging responsibility but acknowledges its susceptibility to emotional campaigns. The vote banning new minarets in 2009 illustrated how fear can influence decisions within an otherwise stable democratic system.
Russia sanctions expose competing definitions
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 triggered the initiative. Ruch considers the invasion an aggression under international law. He recalls that Switzerland initially intended to retain its earlier approach: preventing sanctions from being circumvented through Swiss territory without adopting them itself. Within days, the government changed its mind and adopted EU sanctions.
For Ruch, this reversal damaged Switzerland’s credibility as a mediator. Moscow classified Switzerland as hostile, while Washington welcomed its alignment with Western policy. He argues that perceived impartiality matters beyond Europe, including in the Middle East.
The Swiss People’s Party and Pro-Swiss backed the initiative, while mainstream parties across the center and left opposed it. Campani raises concerns about relations with the EU. Ruch acknowledges those considerations but places greater weight on campaign messaging linking approval to Putin and polarizing Swiss politician Christoph Blocher.
He also challenges sanctions’ effectiveness, arguing that their economic costs can fall on European households and strengthen parties such as Germany’s Alternative for Germany. This is his interpretation of their political consequences.
Ruch’s broader objection concerns consistency. He criticizes sanctioning Russia while avoiding comparable measures against the United States or Israel for actions he also regards as aggression. Since Switzerland depends on major trading partners, he favors withholding such sanctions rather than applying them selectively.
NATO cooperation tests neutrality’s limits
Campani and Ruch distinguish formal NATO membership from increasingly extensive military cooperation. Ruch describes a September 2026 Swiss security strategy proposing cooperation across roughly 15 to 20 areas, including exercises involving collective defense scenarios under NATO’s Article 5.
He questions why Swiss conscripts would rehearse responses to an attack on a NATO member if Switzerland intends to remain outside the alliance’s wars. Such training risks creating practical integration without formally accepting membership obligations. The distinction matters for Switzerland’s freedom of military action.
Security officials see cooperation as a response to Russia and Switzerland’s limited capacity to defend itself alone. Ruch nevertheless wants parliament to establish clearer boundaries. Rejecting the initiative does not, in his view, settle how far military alignment should extend.
Weapons purchases demand public scrutiny
Defense procurement gives that debate immediate financial stakes. Ruch recounts assurances that 36 American F-35 aircraft would cost a fixed six billion Swiss francs. He describes a parliamentary investigation finding that the contract did not guarantee that price and accuses the government of “lying to the people and to the parliament.”
His criticism also covers Patriot missiles and Israeli drones. He estimates that Switzerland has spent roughly three billion francs without receiving the expected operational equipment. These allegations underpin his demand for accountability rather than treating the referendum as endorsement of existing procurement practices.
Ruch praises Defense Minister Martin Pfister’s support for domestic drone production, space capabilities and digital sovereignty. Campani’s questions about data security reinforce the importance of examining dependence on foreign suppliers.
Independence requires freedom to question policy
Drawing on journalist Raphael Lutz’s investigation, Ruch describes arms industry funding flowing into security think tanks whose recommendations influence defense policy. This can reinforce demands for larger budgets and closer NATO cooperation.
He also fears that proposed cooperation with foreign intelligence services against disinformation could suppress legitimate criticism. Citing EU sanctions against Swiss intelligence analyst Jacques Baud and Cameroonian-Swiss activist Nathalie Yamb, he alleges inadequate opportunities to defend themselves and warns that punitive measures encourage self-censorship.
For Ruch, neutrality’s future depends on democratic scrutiny as well as diplomatic choices. Citizens must retain the ability to question security policy, spending and foreign influence without fearing punishment.
[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
”
post-content-short=”
Fair Observer’s Communications and Outreach officer, Roberta Campani, speaks with former Swiss diplomat Jean-Daniel Ruch about Switzerland’s rejection of the Neutrality Initiative. Ruch interprets the result as resistance to a stricter definition of neutrality, rather than abandonment of the…”
post_summery=”In this episode of FO Talks, Roberta Campani and Jean-Daniel Ruch examine Switzerland’s rejection of the Neutrality Initiative. Ruch argues that the result preserves policy flexibility while leaving unresolved how sanctions and NATO cooperation affect Swiss neutrality. He calls for greater scrutiny of defense procurement, foreign influence and restrictions on dissent.”
post-date=”Oct 08, 2026″
post-title=”FO Talks: Does This Mean the End for Switzerland’s Neutrality?” slug-data=”fo-talks-does-this-mean-the-end-for-switzerlands-neutrality”>
FO Talks: Does This Mean the End for Switzerland’s Neutrality?
Stefan Halusa”
post_date=”October 07, 2026 06:38″
pUrl=”https://www.fairobserver.com/video/fo-live-german-economy-now-faces-the-china-challenge-what-lies-ahead/” pid=”164790″
post-content=”
Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh speaks with Stefan Halusa, founder and managing director of Halusa Advisors, and Mauritz Halusa, its co-founder, about the mounting Chinese challenge to German industry. The father-son duo explains how China evolved from a lucrative market for German machinery and automobiles into a formidable competitor in many of the same industries. Atul, Stefan and Mauritz examine Germany’s growing trade deficit, the crisis facing its carmakers, the German struggle to innovate, rising energy costs and whether Europe’s largest economy can adapt.
China vs. Germany
Stefan began visiting China in 1997, four years before the country joined the World Trade Organization (WTO). China’s subsequent industrial expansion initially brought enormous benefits to Germany. In the years after Beijing joined the WTO, Chinese companies bought German machinery, Chinese consumers purchased German cars and German businesses became major investors in the country.
Trade between Germany and China was nearly balanced in 2001 and 2002, with China recording an annual surplus of only about €3 billion. Even in 2019, immediately before the Covid-19 pandemic, Germany’s bilateral trade deficit stood at approximately €13 billion. By 2025, however, it had approached €90 billion. Chinese exports to Europe continued growing in 2026 while German exports to China declined.
Several factors drove this reversal. The collapse of China’s property market damaged household wealth because many Chinese families had placed much of their savings in real estate. Falling property values weakened consumer confidence and reduced domestic consumption. Beijing responded to slowing growth by emphasizing industrial production and exports, particularly in electric vehicles (EVs), robotics, industrial automation, advanced materials, medical devices and biotechnology.
These are also sectors in which German manufacturers traditionally excel. China and Germany are therefore no longer competing only for Chinese consumers. Their companies increasingly confront one another across international markets.
Stefan points to Chinese state subsidies and what he considers a significantly undervalued renminbi as additional advantages for Chinese exporters. Meanwhile, US tariffs have restricted access to the American market, redirecting more Chinese products toward Europe, Germany’s most important trading region.
For decades, Germany pursued Wandel durch Handel, or change through trade. This policy rested on the liberal expectation that deeper commercial ties would encourage political openness in China. Mauritz calls that assumption a “drastic miscalculation.” Trade enriched both countries, but it did not produce the political transformation Germany anticipated.
China’s low consumption may be permanent
Mauritz argues that China’s dependence on exports is not simply a temporary response to economic weakness. In his view, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has consistently prioritized manufacturing and exports over household consumption. The CCP’s Five-Year Plans devote far greater attention to production and trade than to stimulating domestic demand.
Low consumption enables China to direct resources toward industrial expansion, but it also creates excess production that must be sold abroad. This pressure has intensified as the property crisis has reduced household spending and increased dependence on exports. Falling prices, factory closures and job losses could depress consumption further, creating a damaging economic cycle.
Atul adds that Chinese society has endured the Taiping Rebellion, foreign occupation, civil war, the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. Such upheavals can produce habits of caution and saving that outlast a political system. Germany also saves more and consumes less than many English-speaking economies, partly because of its own history of hyperinflation, war and economic destruction.
Atul therefore doubts that Chinese consumption would rise dramatically even if the country became a liberal democracy. Mauritz accepts the importance of culture but maintains that China’s political economy reinforces these tendencies through deliberate planning.
Whatever combination of history, culture and state policy explains Chinese behavior, Stefan believes German companies must accept the result. China’s export orientation is “not just a phase of two or three years,” he says. Germany cannot wait for the old commercial relationship to return. Its industries must prepare for sustained competition from Chinese companies in China, Europe and the wider world.
Chinese speed tops German quality
The automotive industry exposes Germany’s predicament particularly clearly. Mercedes-Benz, BMW, Porsche and Volkswagen built their reputations on engineering excellence, reliability and carefully controlled development. Yet EVs have changed the basis of competition. Software, batteries, digital features and rapid product updates now matter as much as traditional mechanical engineering.
Stefan divides the challenge into two related contests: cost and technology. German carmakers typically take 30 to 36 months to develop a vehicle. This method produces a refined and high-quality product, but Chinese manufacturers can release a model and update it two or three times before a German competitor completes one development cycle. Their initial product may be less polished, but they improve it rapidly in response to consumer demand.
German companies must consequently learn how to shorten development cycles and integrate software more effectively. Stefan says this helps explain why several manufacturers are transferring research and development capacity to China. They want to operate closer to the world’s largest automotive market and absorb the speed and customer focus of their Chinese competitors.
China also offers a substantial cost advantage. German manufacturers pay higher wages and energy prices while carrying a heavier administrative burden. Major German manufacturers and suppliers still make between 20% and 40% of their products in Europe, with Porsche producing an even larger share there. Stefan does not regard high wages as a problem in themselves, since prosperous societies should compensate workers well. He instead emphasizes automation, industrial artificial intelligence and reduced bureaucracy as ways to improve productivity.
Germany can learn from countries besides China. South Korean companies adapt products quickly to local markets, while India combines engineering talent with unconventional and economical approaches to innovation. German companies are already establishing research and competence centers in India to incorporate industrial AI into their production processes and products.
The opportunity (and danger) of moving to China
Volkswagen’s expanding innovation center in the Chinese city of Hefei illustrates the difficult choices facing German industry. The facility contains over a hundred laboratories for software, hardware, batteries and electric powertrains. In November 2025, Volkswagen said it could manufacture an EV entirely in China for half the cost of producing one elsewhere.
Stefan describes the logic as “if you can’t beat them, join them.” Volkswagen has invested heavily in China and earned substantial profits there; it cannot easily abandon the world’s largest automotive market. China’s rapid adoption of electric and plug-in hybrid vehicles also gives German companies access to valuable battery expertise and an enormous base of consumers.
Yet relocation carries serious risks. Research facilities do not move alone. Technical knowledge, skilled jobs and manufacturing expertise move with them. Atul warns that Germany could gradually lose the industrial capabilities on which its prosperity depends.
The competitive payoff is also uncertain. According to Stefan, German manufacturers account for less than 5% of China’s EV market. This is dramatically low compared to their earlier dominant position in internal combustion engine vehicles. Chinese producers benefit from immense scale, government support and intense domestic competition. Mauritz questions whether German manufacturers can win this contest even after shifting investment into China. They may spend billions to join an industrial system in which local competitors retain decisive structural advantages.
This produces a painful dilemma. German carmakers risk becoming technologically isolated if they stay away from China, but they could weaken their domestic industrial base without securing a sustainable position if they move more research and production to the Middle Kingdom.
Germany searches for a response
Germany’s political system makes rapid reform difficult. Proportional representation encourages coalition governments and consensus, but the country’s political center has weakened as support has grown for parties at the extremes. Coalitions are harder to form and, when they emerge, disagreements complicate attempts to reduce bureaucracy, lower costs and implement major economic changes.
Mauritz sees some movement nonetheless. German officials have promised a period of reform, although businesses are still waiting for many concrete measures. More significantly, attitudes toward China are changing within industry. German mechanical engineering associations that were traditionally reluctant to challenge Beijing have begun calling for retaliatory trade measures.
Mauritz describes this reversal as evidence of a developing “China shock 2.0.” Companies that once resisted European restrictions increasingly recognize that subsidized Chinese exports threaten their position at home and abroad. A tougher policy toward Beijing may attract broader support than it did in the past.
Protectionism alone cannot restore German competitiveness. Stefan argues that Germany must seek fairer trading conditions while drawing upon the strength of its decentralized economy. The Mittelstand, Germany’s network of specialized small and medium-sized companies, retains deep technical knowledge and considerable capacity for innovation. These businesses can compete if they adopt new technology and face more equal market conditions.
Germany’s greatest opportunities may lie at the intersection of its established industrial expertise and AI. It does not need to create every foundational AI model itself. German companies can instead apply advanced models to manufacturing, product development and industrial processes. Mauritz also points to process-mining software and environmentally sustainable technologies as areas in which German and European companies remain innovative.
Energy insecurity compounds the industrial challenge
Germany’s industrial model once benefited from cheap Russian natural gas. That supply is no longer available. Furthermore, conflict in the Middle East has made other sources of gas more expensive and less reliable. To make matters worse, Germany shut down its remaining nuclear power plants. Its manufacturers must now compete with Chinese rivals while paying higher energy prices and financing a difficult transition to other energy sources.
Atul questions whether Germany can remain an industrial power without dependable and affordable energy. Mauritz responds that renewable power offers Germany its best route toward greater independence. Renewables already provide about 60% of German electricity and approximately 20% of the country’s total energy needs, he says. Companies are also electrifying more of their production.
Germany’s initial renewable energy drive was motivated largely by climate concerns. The geopolitical disruptions of recent years have changed the debate. Renewable energy is increasingly regarded as a source of national resilience as well as a response to climate change. A foreign supplier cannot easily withhold domestically generated wind and solar power, unlike imported fossil fuels.
The transition nevertheless imposes substantial short-term costs. Germany’s electrical grid was not designed for the current scale and distribution of renewable generation. Industrial facilities require expensive upgrades at a time when many companies already face shrinking margins and tougher competition.
Germany also cannot meet all its energy needs within its borders. Stefan advocates partnerships with sunnier countries capable of producing green hydrogen at scale, including Spain, Italy, India and countries in North Africa. Mauritz places particular emphasis on European integration — a stronger continental grid could connect hydroelectric and wind power from northern Europe with solar energy from Spain, Portugal and Greece.
For both men, the European Union (EU) is not merely a political project. The EU gives Germany access to a vast common market, complementary energy resources and partners whose combined scale can compete more effectively with China and the US.
Can Germany bounce back?
Atul concludes by asking whether Germany is undergoing a genuine Zeitenwende (turning point) and experiencing a new Zeitgeist (the spirit of the age). German Chancellor Olaf Scholz popularized Zeitenwende after Russia invaded Ukraine, primarily to describe the need to rebuild German military capacity. The economic challenge now requires an equally profound change in direction.
Related Reading
Germany can no longer depend on inexpensive Russian energy, continuously expanding Chinese demand and a stable US-led free-trade system. It must compete in an era of tariffs, industrial subsidies, geopolitical conflict and technological disruption. Reform will be painful because Germany’s consensual political system tends to move slowly unless pressure becomes impossible to ignore.
Stefan remains optimistic over the long term, despite expecting several difficult transitional years. Mauritz grounds his confidence in Germany’s skilled population, strong technological foundations and democratic society. He also sees ambition among younger Germans who are starting companies and building careers while seeking to preserve a free and democratic country as a sign of hope.
Germany does not lack talent or industrial knowledge. The country’s challenge is to leverage its strengths more quickly, reduce unnecessary constraints to growth, and work with European and international partners. The very crisis that exposes the weaknesses of Germany’s old economic model could force the country to construct a more innovative and resilient one. As Mauritz observes, “every crisis is an opportunity.” Whether Germany seizes this one will determine if the country continues to remain one of the world’s great industrial powers.
[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
”
post-content-short=”
Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh speaks with Stefan Halusa, founder and managing director of Halusa Advisors, and Mauritz Halusa, its co-founder, about the mounting Chinese challenge to German industry. The father-son duo explains how China evolved from a lucrative market for German machinery and…”
post_summery=”In this episode of FO Talks, Atul Singh and Stefan and Mauritz Halusa discuss China’s transformation from a major market for German exports into a powerful industrial competitor. Germany’s former economic model is buckling as Chinese competition exposes its dependence on exports, energy imports and traditional manufacturing. However, Germany could recover by accelerating innovation, strengthening European cooperation and building a more resilient economy.”
post-date=”Oct 07, 2026″
post-title=”FO Live: German Economy Now Faces the China Challenge: What Lies Ahead?” slug-data=”fo-live-german-economy-now-faces-the-china-challenge-what-lies-ahead”>
FO Live: German Economy Now Faces the China Challenge: What Lies Ahead?
Gary Grappo”
post_date=”October 03, 2026 06:11″
pUrl=”https://www.fairobserver.com/world-news/fo-talks-trumps-dangerous-new-playbook/” pid=”164740″
post-content=”
Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh and former US Ambassador Gary Grappo, who served as Envoy and Head of Mission of the Office of the Quartet Representative Tony Blair in Jerusalem, examine the Trump administration’s approach to allies, adversaries and nuclear weapons. They examine threats against Oman, doubts about American security commitments in East Asia and the risks of expanding nuclear options. As they express, unpredictable leadership weakens alliances and encourages countries to seek security through their own nuclear arsenals.
Threatening Oman undermines a longstanding alliance
Gary describes the Iran conflict as an “unnecessary war from the very beginning.” He argues that Washington entered the campaign without a coherent strategy and is turning toward economic pressure because military action has failed to produce its expected victory. Iran’s leadership has demonstrated resilience and remains committed to preserving the Islamic Republic.
Oman’s position in the Strait of Hormuz makes diplomacy especially important. Gary explains that its territorial waters contain the deep channels used by large vessels entering and leaving the Gulf. Oman’s negotiations with Iran therefore concern its sovereignty, maritime access and national interests.
The distinction between transit tolls and service fees matters. Gary distinguishes charging vessels simply to pass through the strait from charging for services such as emergency assistance or environmental cleanup. He notes that the negotiations remain opaque, while Oman has publicly affirmed its international obligations.
Washington should clarify these issues through conversations with a reliable partner. Threatening to bomb Oman instead turns a diplomatic disagreement into an assault on allied confidence. Gary calls such threats “unconscionable.”
The problem extends beyond presidential rhetoric. Atul and Gary criticize reliance on Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff across major diplomatic portfolios. Concentrating negotiations among presidential confidants, while leaving diplomatic posts unfilled, deprives other governments of dependable channels for resolving disputes.
South Korea questions the American guarantee
Atul shifts the discussion to East Asia, where he describes growing anxiety about resources diverted toward Iran and American pressure on partners to support the war. Allies that were never consulted have little incentive to commit personnel or equipment to a campaign whose objectives remain unclear.
Gary regards South Korean skepticism as justified. Its security relationship with Washington involves shared planning, joint training, compatible weapons and closely aligned military doctrine. Suspending exercises therefore affects an integrated defense system and raises questions about the durability of American commitments.
He suspects the decision occurred without adequate analysis or consultation, while acknowledging that private communications may exist beyond public view. For South Korea, uncertainty is particularly dangerous because North Korea retains its nuclear arsenal and has abandoned reunification as a goal.
Gary dismisses the prospect of North Korean disarmament. A negotiated freeze might be possible, depending on what Washington offers, but eliminating the arsenal is another matter. Any engagement with Pyongyang must account for the security of American allies.
Atul argues that an unreliable guarantee strengthens South Korea’s incentive to acquire nuclear weapons. Gary shares that concern and extends it beyond East Asia. Countries exposed to Russian threats, particularly Poland, could also reconsider dependence on external protection.
Modernization raises questions about nuclear restraint
Atul introduces Pentagon discussions about expanding nuclear options associated with Elbridge Colby. Gary distinguishes these debates from the longstanding existence of American tactical nuclear weapons and the modernization of the arsenal.
Lower yields and improved precision do not make nuclear use predictable. Gary explains that tactical weapons originally addressed fears of overwhelming conventional attacks during the Cold War. Renewed Russian aggression has revived questions about their potential military role.
Nevertheless, possessing options does not resolve the uncertainties surrounding their use. Other governments’ responses could defy military planning, and escalation could become impossible to control.
For Gary, the source of alarm is presidential judgment. Allies and Americans worry about how Trump might employ capabilities that previous presidents approached with caution. Modernization becomes more unsettling when policy appears to change with successive social media posts.
Economic pressure offers an alternative to escalation
Atul reports arguments from young Republicans who favor tactical nuclear strikes against Iran to force surrender. Gary rejects their reasoning: “I don’t think it would be effective.” Such an attack could kill many people while hardening the leadership’s determination.
He also challenges the assumption that disruption in Hormuz leaves no alternative. Economies can adjust through different supply routes, production changes, reduced consumption and infrastructure investment. These adaptations take time but offer a preferable response to nuclear escalation.
Gary advocates stronger sanctions, continued maritime pressure and coordination with allies. He acknowledges the severe hardship facing ordinary Iranians, while arguing that economic pressure could bring their leaders into negotiations.
The discussion ends with a warning. American power depends on credible commitments and sustained diplomacy. Threatening partners while loosening nuclear restraint risks weakening both, leaving allies less secure and proliferation more attractive.
[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
”
post-content-short=”
Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh and former US Ambassador Gary Grappo, who served as Envoy and Head of Mission of the Office of the Quartet Representative Tony Blair in Jerusalem, examine the Trump administration’s approach to allies, adversaries and nuclear weapons. They examine threats against Oman,…”
post_summery=”In this episode of FO Talks, Atul Singh and Gary Grappo examine the Trump administration’s threats against allies and approach to nuclear weapons. Unpredictable American leadership undermines security guarantees and encourages nuclear proliferation. Gary advocates sustained diplomacy, coordinated economic pressure on Iran and caution against nuclear escalation.”
post-date=”Oct 03, 2026″
post-title=”FO Talks: Trump’s Dangerous New Playbook” slug-data=”fo-talks-trumps-dangerous-new-playbook”>
FO Talks: Trump’s Dangerous New Playbook
Fernando Carvajal”
post_date=”October 02, 2026 07:00″
pUrl=”https://www.fairobserver.com/region/middle_east_north_africa/fo-talks-drone-warfare-and-foreign-meddling-in-sudans-devastating-civil-war/” pid=”164727″
post-content=”
Assistant Editor Casey Hermann speaks with Fernando Carvajal, the executive director at The American Center for South Yemen Studies, about Sudan’s bloody civil war. They examine the struggle between General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan’s Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF), tracing how foreign rivalries, drone warfare and failed diplomacy deepen the humanitarian catastrophe.
Military rule and foreign interests drive the conflict
Carvajal traces the current conflict to the October 2021 military coup against Sudan’s civilian-led transitional authorities. The coup derailed efforts to move beyond former Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir’s regime. In April 2023, the partnership between Burhan and Dagalo, known as Hemedti, collapsed into war.
For Carvajal, the split involves competing visions of governance and the influence of Bashir-era Islamist networks within military institutions. He presents the RSF’s opposition to Muslim Brotherhood influence as central to its stated position. This account describes the group’s political justification rather than establishing its commitment to civilian government.
Sudan’s instability also reflects decades of military rule, corruption and regional interference. Agricultural potential has repeatedly collided with insecurity, inadequate investment and disrupted commerce, weakening the foundations of recovery.
Sudan connects African hinterlands with the Red Sea corridor, placing its coastline at the intersection of commercial routes and security rivalries. Port Sudan serves both as a strategic asset and as the SAF government’s base after its displacement from Khartoum.
Carvajal identifies China and Russia as seeking logistical access, while describing Iranian involvement in weapons storage and military support. He recounts RSF allegations that warehouses near Port Sudan held drones and other weapons associated with Iran and Yemen’s Houthis. These allegations underpin his criticism of coverage that overlooks the port’s military uses.
Saudi Arabia’s nearby commercial and energy infrastructure adds another strategic dimension. Carvajal links Riyadh’s engagement with Burhan to concerns about threats originating across the Red Sea. Egyptian, Turkish and Gulf interests further entangle Sudan’s battlefronts with regional competition. These overlapping pressures make Sudan’s war increasingly difficult to resolve.
Displacement and economic collapse reinforce each other
Hermann turns to the civilians fleeing the fight and the pressure on neighboring countries. Refugees enter Chad, Egypt, Ethiopia and South Sudan, spreading the humanitarian burden across states already facing economic difficulties. Carvajal also describes Egyptian returns of Sudanese refugees.
Inside Sudan, displacement, drought and damaged transport routes undermine farming and trade. Armed actors extract revenue through gold exploitation, taxation and extortion, draining communities while financing continued warfare. Reduced harvests and disrupted markets compound hunger and inflation.
Carvajal connects deteriorating humanitarian assistance to US funding restrictions and inadequate contributions from other powers. Direct donor involvement can also reinforce rivalries when assistance favors particular factions.
Drones expand civilian danger
Drone operations increasingly precede ground offensives and shape fighting around cities. Carvajal describes SAF access to Iranian and Turkish drones, alongside Egyptian support, as strengthening its aerial capabilities.
Hermann raises a reported Darfur strike that killed approximately 35 people. Carvajal also discusses a strike on a UN humanitarian convoy, illustrating the civilian consequences of targeting failures. Because the SAF claims governmental legitimacy, he argues, it has a substantial responsibility toward civilians.
Urban fighting compounds these dangers. Carvajal describes military forces and Islamist militias operating within populated areas, exposing residents to attacks and coercion. Although drones can enable precise targeting, technical capability alone cannot ensure civilian protection. Sudan, Yemen and Ukraine reveal how rapidly weapons and tactics migrate between conflicts.
Political exclusions leave diplomacy at an impasse
Carvajal doubts that either principal faction seeks partition. Both aspire to govern a unified Sudan. Nevertheless, entrenched territorial control could produce fragmentation. A separate Darfur would be landlocked, creating further disputes over access, resources and relations with neighboring states.
Diplomacy faces another impasse. In his account, the United States, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates propose humanitarian deescalation and dialogue, but disagreement over Islamist participation obstructs progress. The RSF accepts the proposal in principle, while Burhan resists excluding allies central to his coalition.
Sudan’s prospects therefore depend on more than battlefield outcomes. Effective mediation must reconcile competing political interests while securing humanitarian access and restoring civilian livelihoods. Without that combination, technological escalation and foreign competition threaten to prolong the catastrophe across the country.
[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
”
post-content-short=”
Assistant Editor Casey Hermann speaks with Fernando Carvajal, the executive director at The American Center for South Yemen Studies, about Sudan’s bloody civil war. They examine the struggle between General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan’s Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo’s…”
post_summery=”In this episode of FO Talks, Casey Herrmann and Fernando Carvajal examine how military rule, Islamist influence and foreign rivalries shape Sudan’s civil war. Competition over the Red Sea corridor and drone warfare deepen a humanitarian catastrophe of displacement, hunger and economic collapse. Political divisions and competing external interests obstruct the diplomacy and relief needed to help Sudan.”
post-date=”Oct 02, 2026″
post-title=”FO Talks: Drone Warfare and Foreign Meddling in Sudan’s Devastating Civil War” slug-data=”fo-talks-drone-warfare-and-foreign-meddling-in-sudans-devastating-civil-war”>
FO Talks: Drone Warfare and Foreign Meddling in Sudan’s Devastating Civil War
Sebastian Schäffer”
post_date=”September 25, 2026 06:50″
pUrl=”https://www.fairobserver.com/video/fo-talks-will-historic-afd-victory-now-sink-german-chancellor-friedrich-merz/” pid=”164636″
post-content=”
Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh and Sebastian Schäffer, Director of the Institute for the Danube Region and Central Europe, discuss the Alternative for Germany’s (or Alternative for Deutschland, abbreviated AfD) historic electoral victory in Saxony-Anhalt. They examine the economic stagnation, political disillusionment and enduring East–West divide fueling the far right’s rise. They also assess German Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s leadership, Germany’s increasingly fragmented political system and the future of the country’s firewall against the AfD.
East Germany’s discontent fuels the AfD
Saxony-Anhalt is one of Germany’s 16 federal states and has roughly two million inhabitants. Located in the former German Democratic Republic (GDR), the state was established in its current form during German reunification. It contains areas once sustained by industry but now marked by economic decline and outward migration. Singh describes the state as part of Germany’s rust belt.
Despite having relatively few foreign residents, Saxony-Anhalt has become a center of support for the anti-immigration AfD. Schäffer identifies three underlying causes: the persistent belief among East Germans that they remain second-class citizens, dissatisfaction with established parties and frustration over the handling of migration and the economy.
The AfD’s victory follows its 2024 success in Thuringia. Schäffer argues, however, that the most consequential result was the Christian Democratic Union of Germany’s (CDU) collapse rather than the AfD’s expected first-place finish. The outcome reveals how sharply traditional parties have lost voters’ confidence. Many voters appear less committed to the AfD’s detailed program than determined to reject a political establishment they believe has ignored them.
Merz has overpromised and underdelivered
Merz presented himself as a business-minded alternative to conventional career politicians. After serving in politics during the 1980s and 1990s, he worked as a corporate lawyer and investment manager at BlackRock before returning to lead the CDU. His experience encouraged expectations that he could restore growth and modernize Germany’s economy.
Parliament gave Merz exceptional room to act by approving €500 billion in borrowing for infrastructure, defense and economic modernization. He also promised to halve the AfD’s support and pledged to supply Taurus cruise missiles to Ukraine if Russia continued attacking civilians. Schäffer argues that visible progress has not followed.
“He has overpromised and underdelivered drastically,” Schäffer says. Merz has also alienated citizens by telling them to work harder while appearing unable to fulfill his own commitments. His communication problems compound the impression that his government lacks empathy, direction and urgency. By adopting some of the AfD’s rhetoric without delivering the change voters expected, he may have strengthened the party he intended to weaken.
Germany hasn’t prepared for industrial change
Germany’s economic malaise predates Merz. Its automotive industry, long built around mastery of the internal combustion engine, now faces severe pressure from Chinese electric vehicle manufacturers. Political and corporate leaders failed to anticipate the transition early enough, leaving Germany without a convincing strategy for industrial renewal.
Former Chancellor Gerhard Schröder confronted an earlier period of stagnation with the controversial Hartz labor reforms. No comparable structural program has emerged today. Global crises have also raised energy costs and weakened growth, but Schäffer argues that German governments could have done more to prepare the country and protect citizens from economic disruption.
Many Germans no longer believe that the next generation will enjoy greater prosperity than the last. This loss of optimism strengthens parties offering a return to an idealized past. The nostalgia hits particularly hard in former East Germany, where some voters romanticize aspects of the GDR despite its authoritarian system and Soviet domination.
Schäffer believes the AfD does not truly want responsibility for governing. Opposition allows it to promise sweeping change, reject compromises and blame other parties when those promises prove impossible.
Fragmentation tests Germany’s coalition model
Germany uses a mixed electoral system combining constituency contests with proportional party representation. Parties generally must receive at least 5% of the vote to enter parliament. The system usually produces coalition governments and makes negotiation essential.
Critics argue that the proliferation of parties, including the AfD and Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht, has transformed compromise into paralysis. The previous coalition of the Social Democrats, Greens and Free Democrats became associated with indecision and internal conflict. Germany’s postwar consensus worked when the social fabric was stronger, but growing fragmentation now makes agreement more difficult.
Schäffer nevertheless defends coalition-building as one of democracy’s fundamental rules. “We need coalition governments, we need compromise,” he says. The deeper problem is not proportional representation itself but parties’ failure to use compromise to produce coherent policies. Political leaders must debate which policies work rather than reducing every question to a contest between left and right.
Migration intensifies a broader crisis of confidence
More than a quarter of Germany’s population has an immigration background. Migration and integration have consequently become central political issues, but Schäffer warns that politicians repeatedly exploit border rhetoric during elections instead of developing workable European solutions.
He maintains that “basic humanism requires us to help if people are seeking refuge.” Germany must nevertheless demand more from those unwilling to integrate while creating better opportunities for those who want to participate in society. Schäffer argues that the country needs migration because of its demographic decline, but its leaders have communicated poorly and failed to balance obligations with expectations.
The AfD’s strongest results in areas with relatively few migrants suggest that its appeal reflects broader political alienation as much as direct experience of immigration. Economic insecurity, distrust of institutions and resentment toward governing elites give simplified anti-immigration arguments greater force.
Since Singh and Schäffer held this interview, the CDU has lost the September 20 Berlin election and couldn’t garner enough votes in the September 20 Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania state election to enter parliament — the latter is a historic failure. A CDU defeat in North Rhine-Westphalia next year could make his position untenable. Merz’s fate depends on whether his government can restore economic confidence, answer public concerns and prove that democratic compromise can still deliver meaningful change. If it cannot, the political firewall excluding the AfD from the government will become increasingly difficult to maintain.
[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
”
post-content-short=”
Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh and Sebastian Schäffer, Director of the Institute for the Danube Region and Central Europe, discuss the Alternative for Germany’s (or Alternative for Deutschland, abbreviated AfD) historic electoral victory in Saxony-Anhalt. They examine the economic stagnation,…”
post_summery=”In this episode of FO Talks, Atul Singh and Sebastian Schäffer examine how economic anxiety, party dissatisfaction and East German agitation have fueled the AfD’s rise. Chancellor Friedrich Merz strengthened the far right by promising economic renewal and political change and not delivering. Germany’s leaders must restore public confidence, manage immigration and demonstrate that coalition politics can bring change.”
post-date=”Sep 25, 2026″
post-title=”FO Talks: Will Historic AfD Victory Now Sink German Chancellor Friedrich Merz?” slug-data=”fo-talks-will-historic-afd-victory-now-sink-german-chancellor-friedrich-merz”>
FO Talks: Will Historic AfD Victory Now Sink German Chancellor Friedrich Merz?
Aron Rimanyi”
post_date=”September 22, 2026 06:52″
pUrl=”https://www.fairobserver.com/politics/fo-talks-how-viktor-orban-lost-control-of-hungary/” pid=”164597″
post-content=”
Editor-at-Large Kent Jenkins Jr. speaks with Aron Rimanyi, an associate at Training The Street, about former Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s defeat following 16 consecutive years in power. Hungarian Prime Minister Péter Magyar’s Respect and Freedom Party (or TISZA) party has secured the parliamentary supermajority once enjoyed by Orbán’s Fidesz party. Jenkins and Rimanyi examine the economic discontent and grassroots mobilization behind this political reversal, as well as the new government’s efforts to reform Hungary’s institutions, finances and foreign policy.
An illiberal system built around centralized power
Orbán entered office in 2010 with a two-thirds parliamentary majority. His government concentrated authority around the prime minister, reshaped institutions and renamed the Supreme Court the Curia. It also cultivated what Orbán called a national capitalist class by transferring assets and opportunities to Hungarian business owners.
Rimanyi argues that this economic project became associated with corruption because many beneficiaries had personal or family connections to Orbán. Government allies also acquired influence over much of Hungary’s media. For younger Hungarians, the resulting assumption that influence required government connections may have done even more damage than the immediate economic consequences.
This concentration of political, economic and media power led scholars to describe Hungary as an example of an authoritarian breakthrough: Elections continued, but removing the governing party appeared nearly impossible.
Economic weakness undermined Fidesz
Orbán’s system remained stable while living standards improved. His government used subsidies, tax rebates and other benefits to maintain support, but Hungary eventually fell into a middle-income trap marked by weak productivity and insufficient investment in higher-value industries. In 2022–2023, Hungary recorded the European Union’s highest inflation rate.
As wages failed to keep pace with prices, perceptions of corruption grew harder to overlook. Rimanyi summarizes the delayed consequences of Orbán’s economic model simply: “The bill ultimately comes due.”
Magyar translated these structural problems into everyday language about food prices, wages and Hungary’s declining position relative to neighboring countries. Meanwhile, Fidesz concentrated its campaign on warnings about Ukraine, an issue Rimanyi says did not reflect voters’ principal concerns.
Magyar remobilized Hungarian voters
Before establishing a developed party organization, Magyar traveled throughout Hungary and held as many as five rallies a day. He visited small villages that national politicians had rarely reached, addressed local concerns and assembled a grassroots volunteer network.
This campaign helped TISZA win 55% of the popular vote. Under electoral rules created by Fidesz, that result produced a two-thirds parliamentary majority. The outcome demonstrated that even a population regarded as politically disengaged could mobilize rapidly around new leadership.
Magyar has continued using social media and direct public engagement to sustain that participation. His combative communication style can deepen divisions, but his emphasis on practical matters such as living costs, energy use and water shortages has also appealed beyond TISZA’s electoral base.
TISZA begins rebuilding the state
The new government has appointed ministers with international corporate experience and begun tightening public finances. Hungary recently reported monthly fiscal surpluses, although Rimanyi notes that the figures require further examination. The government has also secured the release of much of the €17 billion in EU funding frozen over rule-of-law concerns and inadequate spending plans.
A new Bureau for Reclaiming Public Money will investigate assets privatized under Orbán. Fidesz describes the effort as a politically motivated witch hunt, while TISZA presents it as a lawful recovery process. Rimanyi expects political motivations and legitimate judicial review to coexist.
Parliament has also removed Orbán-appointed President Tamás Sulyok through a constitutional amendment and elected retired judge András Baka as a transitional president. Orbán’s government had pushed Baka out as Supreme Court president in 2011. His return carries symbolic weight as TISZA prepares a new constitution, although the government faces the difficult task of building consensus without marginalizing Fidesz voters.
Hungary changes course
Magyar has moved Hungary closer to the EU consensus on Ukraine while stopping short of a complete foreign policy reversal. Hungary will still not send weapons to Ukraine, but it has stopped blocking a €90 billion loan package, supported the opening of EU accession negotiations and identified Russia as the aggressor.
Hungary nevertheless remains dependent on Russian hydrocarbons and Russian-supported nuclear infrastructure. Rimanyi therefore expects continued practical cooperation alongside gradual energy diversification.
For other countries, Hungary demonstrates both the limits of patronage-based government and the instability of apparently entrenched political cultures. As Rimanyi concludes, “Political culture is easier to change than a lot of people think.” Economic deterioration can weaken ideological loyalty, while credible leadership and sustained local engagement can rapidly return disengaged citizens to political life.
[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
”
post-content-short=”
Editor-at-Large Kent Jenkins Jr. speaks with Aron Rimanyi, an associate at Training The Street, about former Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s defeat following 16 consecutive years in power. Hungarian Prime Minister Péter Magyar’s Respect and Freedom Party (or TISZA) party has secured…”
post_summery=”In this episode of FO Talks, Kent Jenkins Jr. and Aron Rimanyi discuss how economic stagnation, inflation and grassroots mobilization ended former Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s 16-year rule. They examine Péter Magyar’s efforts to reform state institutions, recover public money and strengthen EU relations. Hungary proves that even entrenched illiberal systems can unravel when economic hardship revives public participation.”
post-date=”Sep 22, 2026″
post-title=”FO Talks: How Viktor Orbán Lost Control of Hungary” slug-data=”fo-talks-how-viktor-orban-lost-control-of-hungary”>
FO Talks: How Viktor Orbán Lost Control of Hungary
Fernando Carvajal”
post_date=”September 17, 2026 06:05″
pUrl=”https://www.fairobserver.com/region/middle_east_north_africa/fo-live-the-red-sea-crisis-power-struggles-in-yemen-and-sudan/” pid=”164533″
post-content=”
Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh speaks with Fernando Carvajal, the executive director at The American Center for South Yemen Studies, and former Aden Free Zone Chair Abdul Galil Shaif about Islamist extremism in Yemen and Sudan. They examine how armed and political factions obstruct dialogue, marginalize civil society and prolong conflicts on both sides of the Red Sea. They also preview a September 14 panel at the UK House of Commons, cohosted by Member of Parliament Sharon Hodgson, on the regional and international consequences of these crises.
Extremists obstruct Sudan’s democratic transition
Carvajal says recent developments demonstrate why the parliamentary discussion is timely. Investigations reported by The New York Times and The Washington Post have raised allegations that the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Port Sudan government used chemical weapons.
Sudan’s current civil war erupted in April 2023, following the 2021 military coup that dismantled the civilian-led transitional council formed after the overthrow of former Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir. Carvajal states that Islamist factions embedded within the military establishment are now seeking to preserve the authoritarian system associated with Bashir.
In September 2025, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and the United States proposed a humanitarian ceasefire followed by an inclusive political dialogue. General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan initially appeared receptive but reversed course after Muslim Brotherhood elements rejected foreign involvement. He later proposed a military-managed national dialogue that excluded important civilian parties and civil society organizations.
Yemen’s factions benefit from political paralysis
Across the Red Sea, the Houthis continue to threaten Saudi territory and attack targets in southern Yemen. Carvajal points to strikes on military bases in Hadhramaut and the near destruction of Mokha port. He says forces associated with the Muslim Brotherhood-linked al-Islah party have hesitated to confront the Houthis directly, leaving much of the fighting to local forces around the cities of Hodeidah, Mokha and Taiz.
Shaif describes Yemen as a “forgotten war” that attracts international attention primarily when instability threatens economic interests. He argues that al-Islah is exploiting the confrontation with the Houthis to rebuild its political influence through government institutions, charities and nongovernmental organizations.
Although the Houthis are the immediate military adversary, Shaif regards al-Islah as a longer-term strategic danger. He believes its ideological project threatens the secular and progressive traditions of southern Yemen, including the advances in women’s rights achieved before unification.
The Red Sea becomes an economic lifeline
The conflicts have implications far beyond Yemen and Sudan because they surround one of the world’s most important commercial corridors. Singh notes that the Strait of Hormuz has effectively been closed since March 1 amid the US/Israel–Iran war. Shipping companies and Gulf states have consequently become more dependent on the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Red Sea.
Shaif explains that this dependence gives the Houthis considerable leverage over international commerce. Disruption at Bab el-Mandeb could place a substantial share of global trade at risk while restricting the remaining routes available for Gulf oil exports.
Saudi Arabia is therefore exploring a pipeline through Hadhramaut and Mahra that would bypass vulnerable maritime chokepoints. Shaif argues that Yemen’s humanitarian suffering still receives insufficient attention, while the possibility of disrupted energy supplies and rising transportation costs has finally made its instability an urgent international concern.
Western debates miss the larger threat
Carvajal connects these regional conflicts to intensifying Western debates about Islamist organizations. Some US states are pursuing measures against groups affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, while right-wing politicians in France have proposed banning the hijab. Britain has experienced similar controversy, including former Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s comparison of veiled women to letter boxes.
Shaif says banning the hijab lacks broad support among the British public and distracts from the political structures that allow extremist movements to expand. He calls the debate a “red herring” that reduces a complicated security problem to religious clothing.
He also warns that Islamic extremism must be considered alongside far-right extremism. Western governments, he contends, contributed to present instability by funding jihadist forces in Afghanistan without accounting for the movements and networks that would subsequently emerge.
Civil society needs a place at the table
Carvajal sees a common pattern in Yemen and Sudan. Armed Islamist factions reject inclusive negotiations because democratic dialogue could weaken their power. Sudan’s military leadership excludes civilian organizations, while the Houthis seek direct negotiations with Saudi Arabia rather than a broader Yemeni political process. Southern dialogue in Yemen has also stalled, benefiting al-Islah and other entrenched actors.
Shaif and Singh criticize the United Nations for failing to deliver a political settlement in Yemen. Without institutional reform and stronger support for representative civil society, they see little prospect of meaningful progress.
The House of Commons panel will bring together Shaif, former UK Ambassador Edmund Fitton-Brown, Sudanese civil rights activist Anes Himemed and other regional experts. Moderated by Fair Observer Chair Claire Whitaker, the event aims to show policymakers how extremist networks on both shores of the Red Sea undermine peace, accountable government and global economic security.
[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
”
post-content-short=”
Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh speaks with Fernando Carvajal, the executive director at The American Center for South Yemen Studies, and former Aden Free Zone Chair Abdul Galil Shaif about Islamist extremism in Yemen and Sudan. They examine how armed and political factions obstruct dialogue,…”
post_summery=”In this episode of FO Live, Atul Singh, Fernando Carvajal and Abdul Galil Shaif examine how Islamist factions obstruct political dialogue and prolong conflicts in Yemen and Sudan. These struggles threaten democratic government and trade routes through the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Resolving them requires stronger international institutions and political processes that give civilian voices a meaningful role.”
post-date=”Sep 17, 2026″
post-title=”FO Live: The Red Sea Crisis — Power Struggles in Yemen and Sudan” slug-data=”fo-live-the-red-sea-crisis-power-struggles-in-yemen-and-sudan”>
FO Live: The Red Sea Crisis — Power Struggles in Yemen and Sudan
Bobby J. Smith II”
post_date=”September 16, 2026 06:30″
pUrl=”https://www.fairobserver.com/politics/fo-talks-the-fight-for-answers-investigating-black-deaths/” pid=”164509″
post-content=”
Fair Observer editor Lucy Golish speaks with Bobby J. Smith, Associate Professor of African American Studies at the University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign, about the long history of underinvestigated Black deaths in the United States. Smith states that racial assumptions shape how victims are portrayed, how authorities conduct investigations and whether grieving families receive answers. He calls for greater scrutiny of investigative protocols, stronger accountability for legal actors and media coverage that treats black victims as human beings rather than entertainment.
Black deaths reveal a historical pattern
Smith traces today’s controversies to the 1955 murder of 14-year-old Emmett Till, although he stresses that the killing of black Americans under racist circumstances began long before then. Black communities have consistently protested such deaths, but the broader public and those in power have often failed to respond with the same urgency.
Smith argues that this indifference reflects assumptions that black people are inferior or disposable. When a black person dies violently, public discussion frequently focuses on the victim’s behavior. People ask why the victim entered a particular neighborhood, stayed outside late or attended a certain gathering. The victim consequently becomes a suspected participant in their own death.
This tendency is especially pronounced when the victim is young. Golish describes the adultification of black children, who are denied the freedom to make the ordinary mistakes associated with adolescence. Smith contrasts their treatment with that of white children, who are more often allowed to experiment, misbehave and mature without their actions defining the remainder of their lives.
Media can humanize or exploit victims
Mamie Till-Mobley, Emmett’s mother, understood that media exposure could compel the country to confront what happened to her son. Her decision to hold an open-casket funeral and permit photographs of Emmett’s mutilated body helped mobilize black Americans and attract wider attention to the Civil Rights Movement.
Modern social media operate differently. Graphic recordings appear repeatedly in algorithmically selected feeds, often without context. Smith stopped watching videos of black people being killed during the Black Lives Matter movement because they were affecting his mental health. He fears that constant exposure has desensitized audiences. “Black death should not be entertainment,” he says.
Body-camera footage can provide indispensable evidence, particularly when official accounts conflict with what occurred. Yet posting such material for attention or advertising revenue turns suffering into a commodity. Smith places this practice within a much older history that includes the sale of lynching postcards. As he bluntly observes, “black death is lucrative, sadly.”
Investigators skip essential steps
Golish raises cases in which authorities reached preliminary conclusions before completing basic investigative work. They quickly decided Carter Jackson’s death was a suicide, while Tamila Horford’s fatal fall from a balcony was an accident. Their families questioned whether authorities had collected evidence, interviewed everyone involved or adequately considered foul play.
Smith rejects the suggestion that racial prejudices merely enter otherwise neutral investigations. He argues that they are already woven into American institutions and communities. Proper investigations require authorities to preserve and analyze evidence, interview relevant witnesses and avoid reaching conclusions before completing established procedures.
Investigators already receive professional training and operate under formal protocols. The immediate problem, Smith contends, is therefore not an absence of rules but the failure to apply them consistently. Preliminary findings can become permanent explanations even when important questions remain unanswered.
Unresolved cases prolong families’ grief
Smith describes the investigation into Nolan Wells’s death as one of the most improper he has encountered in years. Wells died after attending a gathering with numerous people, yet conflicting accounts have left the circumstances unclear. Smith finds it extraordinary that so many potential witnesses were present without investigators establishing what happened.
Official failures have encouraged the rise of online sleuths who collect posts, compare accounts and construct their own timelines. Some uncover information that authorities appear to have overlooked, but the resulting speculation can also create chaos, threaten witnesses and obscure the victim’s life.
The absence of answers deprives families of resolution. Determining what happened cannot reverse a death, but it can allow relatives to grieve without constantly defending their loved one against accusations of drunkenness, criminality or suicide.
Accountability begins with investigative protocols
Smith distinguishes between the law and the people responsible for applying it. Laws may establish procedures, but investigators, coroners and other officials interpret evidence and exercise institutional power. Reform must therefore examine the conduct of these system actors.
He proposes comparative case studies to establish why investigative protocols succeed in some jurisdictions but fail in others. Departments may also need additional resources to manage demanding caseloads, but limited capacity cannot justify abandoning essential procedures.
Smith urges activists and journalists to obtain their local departments’ investigative protocols, study them and identify skipped steps. Investigators must investigate every death thoroughly, regardless of the victim’s race, and provide families with the answers and justice they deserve.
[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
”
post-content-short=”
Fair Observer editor Lucy Golish speaks with Bobby J. Smith, Associate Professor of African American Studies at the University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign, about the long history of underinvestigated Black deaths in the United States. Smith states that racial assumptions shape how victims are…”
post_summery=”In this episode of FO Talks, Lucy Golish and Bobby J. Smith examine the historical pattern of underinvestigated black deaths in America. Racial assumptions often influence how authorities portray victims, follow investigative protocols and answer grieving families. And while social media can expose injustice, it can also turn black trauma into entertainment.”
post-date=”Sep 16, 2026″
post-title=”FO Talks: The Fight For Answers — Investigating Black Deaths” slug-data=”fo-talks-the-fight-for-answers-investigating-black-deaths”>
FO Talks: The Fight For Answers — Investigating Black Deaths
Helder Ferreira do Vale”
post_date=”September 15, 2026 06:40″
pUrl=”https://www.fairobserver.com/politics/fo-talks-lula-vs-another-bolsonaro-brazils-2026-election/” pid=”164476″
post-content=”
Fair Observer’s Communications and Outreach officer, Roberta Campani, speaks with Helder Ferreira do Vale, a professor of Political Science at the Catholic University of Brasília, about Brazil’s closely contested 2026 presidential election. Incumbent President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva leads Senator Flávio Bolsonaro in first-round polling, but a runoff could produce a technical tie. Ferreira do Vale explains how polarization, congressional fragmentation, US involvement and Brazil’s resilient institutions will shape the contest.
Brazil returns to a polarized contest
Ferreira do Vale says that intense political polarization has defined Brazil since 2018. The coming election resembles the 2022 contest, when Lula narrowly defeated former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro, who subsequently challenged the electoral system and was prosecuted following an attempted coup.
Lula is seeking a second consecutive term and his fourth overall. Brazilian law permits presidents to serve two consecutive terms. Lula governed from 2003 to 2010, remained out of office for three presidential terms and returned to power in 2022. His candidacy is therefore legal.
Flávio Bolsonaro has emerged as the principal heir to his father’s conservative movement. A former senator and Jair Bolsonaro’s eldest son, he belongs to a family whose members have helped sustain the former president’s rhetoric and political organization. Ferreira do Vale believes former First Lady of Brazil Michelle Bolsonaro might have made a stronger candidate because of her charisma and potential appeal among women. A public family dispute, however, pushed her aside.
A runoff could erase Lula’s lead
Brazilian presidential candidates must receive more than 50% of valid votes to win in the first round. Polls give Lula an advantage of roughly four to six percentage points over Flávio. Lula benefits from being the left’s only major candidate, while several conservative candidates divide the right-wing vote.
Yet Lula’s rejection rate ranges from 45% to 48%, limiting his ability to attract additional support. The race consequently becomes much closer in projected second-round matchups. Polls place Lula between 40% and 45%, compared with approximately 44% for Flávio.
Several minor conservative candidates currently command between 2% and 4% each. Their voters are likely to move toward Flávio in a runoff. Ferreira do Vale therefore expects a contest resembling 2022: a relatively comfortable first-round performance for Lula followed by a far tighter second round.
The electorate may nevertheless be less rigid than it was four years ago. Approximately 51% of voters, in a spontaneous poll, now say they could change their minds before the election, compared with 32% during the 2022 campaign.
Lula dominates the left as Congress constrains presidents
Lula has remained Brazil’s central left-wing figure since its transition to democracy. Ferreira do Vale says Lula has systematically sidelined potential rivals, leaving the left without an obvious successor despite the president’s age.
The Workers’ Party has survived by adapting its coalition and geographic base. It began as a labor movement supported by parts of São Paulo’s middle class, but its strongest support now comes from the poorer Northeast. Ferreira do Vale calls it “a very adaptable, chameleonic party” capable of competing locally and nationally.
Brazil’s right is more fragmented. Many conservative parties have strong local organizations but limited ideological or programmatic commitments. They dominate Congress, which has accumulated substantial control over public spending and can pressure presidents through the budget.
This structure produces unexpected alliances. The right-wing president of the lower house has endorsed Lula instead of Flávio, demonstrating that congressional leaders may prioritize access to power over ideological loyalty. Whoever wins the presidency will therefore have to negotiate with a conservative legislature.
Trump becomes an issue in Brazil’s election
Foreign policy plays an unusually prominent role. Flávio’s allies suggest that his victory would secure support from US President Donald Trump, whose administration has cultivated close relationships with conservative Latin American governments.
Relations between Brasília and Washington have deteriorated. In July, the United States imposed a 25% tariff increase on Brazilian goods, citing unfair trade. Brazil has indicated that it will not grant a visa to a US senator nominated as ambassador before the election. Washington responded by canceling Brazilian ambassador Maria Luiza Ribeiro Viotti’s visa.
Lula’s government fears that a Trump-aligned US ambassador could question the election’s legitimacy. Jair Bolsonaro previously attacked Brazil’s electronic voting system and cast doubt on electoral results.
Ferreira do Vale rejects claims that the system itself is unreliable, describing it as “quite efficient, transparent.” Electoral authorities and the Supreme Court are nevertheless engaging international observers and civil society to explain the process and protect public confidence.
Brazil’s institutions favor continuity
The candidates differ in rhetoric, particularly on environmental protection and social policy, but both will face powerful institutional constraints. Brazil’s agricultural caucus exercises significant influence in Congress, while the country’s biofuel, food and agricultural industries limit how sharply either administration could change policy.
Major social institutions have also survived political transitions. Bolsa Família, the cash-transfer program introduced under Lula, remained in place under Jair Bolsonaro. Brazil’s decentralized public health system, established during the transition to democracy, has endured changes at every level of government and operates one of the world’s largest free HIV/AIDS treatment programs.
Ferreira do Vale expects similar continuity after the election. Brazil’s large bureaucracy, federal structure and numerous veto institutions make radical changes difficult. Those safeguards helped the country withstand the events of January 8, 2023.
Voters still confront serious problems. Household debt has reduced disposable income, while 33% identify public violence as their greatest concern. Despite average economic growth of approximately 3% over the past four years, many Brazilians continue to experience financial hardship.
Neither Lula nor the Flávio movement has resolved these structural challenges. The election may therefore be extremely close, but Ferreira do Vale expects Brazil’s institutions and established social programs to remain largely intact regardless of the winner.
[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
”
post-content-short=”
Fair Observer’s Communications and Outreach officer, Roberta Campani, speaks with Helder Ferreira do Vale, a professor of Political Science at the Catholic University of Brasília, about Brazil’s closely contested 2026 presidential election. Incumbent President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva leads…”
post_summery=”In this episode of FO Talks, Roberta Campani and Helder Ferreira do Vale examine Brazil’s presidential election between incumbent President Lula and Senator Flávio Bolsonaro. Lula leads in first-round polls, but support from conservative voters could produce a tie in a runoff. Despite foreign pressure and concerns of violence, Brazil’s institutions and major social programs will likely remain resilient.”
post-date=”Sep 15, 2026″
post-title=”FO Talks: Lula vs Another Bolsonaro — Brazil’s 2026 Election” slug-data=”fo-talks-lula-vs-another-bolsonaro-brazils-2026-election”>
FO Talks: Lula vs Another Bolsonaro — Brazil’s 2026 Election




