WASHINGTON: Despite deep reservations and fears of domestic backlash, most Muslim-majority countries associated with the Gaza peace process want the proposed International Stabilisation Force (ISF) to succeed, arguing that only such a force can ensure the security and survival of Palestinians in the besieged enclave, diplomats involved in the discussions told Dawn.
“Israel has already killed [more than] 70,000 people in Gaza, and only an international force with a clear mandate can stop this genocide,” said a diplomat from a Muslim nation, directly associated with the process.
Another diplomat acknowledged that participation in the ISF would place contributing states in an extremely difficult position, but said the alternatives were even bleaker.
“We know we would be pushed into a very difficult situation if we joined the ISF,” he said. “But the alternative is even worse — uninterrupted bloodshed in Gaza, and that’s not acceptable to us.”
Diplomats say the choice is a difficult one; warn that Palestinian blood will continue to flow in the absence of proposed ISF
A third diplomat said governments were under no illusion about the political costs at home. “We realise it will not be a popular war. We will be criticised at home too, but we have to get involved,” he said.
The ISF is a central pillar of a US-backed plan for “Phase 2” in Gaza, aimed at stabilising the territory after a ceasefire, training a Palestinian police force, overseeing demilitarisation, and enabling limited reconstruction.
Several Muslim countries — including Egypt, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkiye, the United Arab Emirates, Indonesia, Azerbaijan and Pakistan — are involved in discussions around the initiative, though most have stopped short of firm troop commitments.
Diplomats say broad conceptual support exists, but final decisions hinge on unresolved questions about the force’s mandate, authority, rules of engagement and command structure.
The ISF is expected to operate under UN Security Council Resolution 2803, which envisages enforcement of demilitarisation and provision of security, but details remain contested. Reports in the Western media have mentioned Indonesia and Azerbaijan as potential contributors, while Pakistan, Turkiye, Malaysia and Morocco have also shown interest.
Egypt and Qatar — both key mediators between Israel and Hamas — are engaged in talks on ISF’s command structure and have helped establish coordination mechanisms.
At the same time, resistance remains strong.
Israel has explicitly opposed the participation of Turkish troops, citing Ankara’s past political support for Hamas. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have reportedly declined to contribute forces, though both have attended planning conferences. Pakistan, for its part, has conveyed that disarming Hamas would not be its role.
Against this backdrop, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy shared with the media a series of assessments by its senior fellows, warning that without a credible ISF, Israel would insist on retaining broad freedom of military action in Gaza.
“If the ISF is not given a clear mandate and full enforcement powers, or if Hamas refuses to surrender its weapons, Israel will press for continued freedom of action against renewed rearmament efforts, a freeze on any planned Gaza reconstruction efforts beyond the yellow line, and freedom to remain in its current Gaza deployment zones until these issues are addressed,” said Neomi Neumann, an adjunct fellow at the institute.
Dennis Ross, a former special assistant to ex-president Obama, said demilitarisation would be the decisive test. “In the end, everything will likely hinge on implementing a credible approach to demilitarising Gaza — not only because Israel will demand it, but also because Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have made clear there will be no major Gulf investment in reconstruction so long as Hamas retains access to military weapons and infrastructure,” he said.
Mr Ross argued for a phased approach including the beginning of reconstruction in secured areas.
“Whatever the case, a comprehensive plan is needed that synchronises all of these moving parts,” he added.
Ms Neumann cautioned that many fundamentals were still unresolved.
“Still unknown, however, is which countries will agree to participate, under what conditions they will deploy, and at which specific locations,” she said, warning that the success of Phase 2 and the durability of any ceasefire would depend on “immediate security stabilisation, gradual disarmament, and the transfer of authority to a reformed PA — none of which are possible without a clear definition of the ISF’s mandate.”
Michael Jacobson, a senior fellow at the institute’s counterterrorism programme, said disagreements among US partners were also slowing progress.
“The United States, Jordan, and Egypt have each developed their own training plans, and Israel has yet to back any of them,” he said.
“To move forward, the Trump administration must get all of these governments on board with a consensus plan,” including clarity on command and control, formal authorities, and alignment between mission and capabilities.
Another unresolved issue is the future role of the Palestinian Authority.
Ghaith al-Omari, a senior fellow at the institute, said Washington faced a delicate balancing act. “Allowing for an immediate PA operational role would go against the US plan and signal that Washington’s demands for PA reform are not serious,” he said. “Yet completely excluding the PA would serve Hamas’s goals and may face opposition from Arab states.”
Mr al-Omari suggested a compromise under which the PA initially plays a limited, symbolic role, such as appointing a liaison to a governing body overseeing Gaza’s transition.
For now, diplomats say, Muslim states remain torn between political risk and moral urgency. Yet many privately argue that without an international force on the ground, Gaza faces the prospect of prolonged devastation — a burden they say they are increasingly unwilling to bear.
Published in Dawn, January 6th, 2026
