Contempt power not ‘personal armour’ for judges: Supreme Court

Contempt power not ‘personal armour’ for judges: Supreme Court

Observing that the power to punish for criminal contempt is not a “personal armour” for judges to stifle criticism, the Supreme Court on Wednesday (December 10, 2025) set aside an April 23 order of the Bombay High Court that had held a Navi Mumbai woman guilty of criminal contempt and sentenced her to one week’s simple imprisonment for circulating a housing society notice referring to judges as part of a “dog mafia.”

A Bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta noted that the woman had expressed unconditional remorse at the earliest stage and had tendered an unqualified apology for her conduct.

“In exercise of contempt jurisdiction, courts must remain conscious that this power is not a personal armour for judges, nor a sword to silence criticism. After all, it requires fortitude to acknowledge contrition for one’s lapse, and an even greater virtue to extend forgiveness to the erring. Mercy, therefore, must remain an integral part of the judicial conscience, to be extended where the contemnor sincerely acknowledges his lapse and seeks to atone for it”, the ruling said.

What constitutes as contempt of court in India? | Explained

The judges further observed that a holistic reading of Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (1971 Act), makes it clear that the provision not only authorises the imposition of punishment but also expressly preserves the court’s power to remit it. This discretion, the Bench underscored, survives even after a finding of guilt and the award of punishment.

“The statutory scheme is thus clear, once repentance is demonstrated, the court may act with magnanimity. However, the apology must be bona fide and must satisfy the judicial conscience of the court, which is required to exercise this discretion judiciously”, the Bench said.

Earlier, the High Court had taken suo motu cognisance of a circular issued in January by the woman, Vineeta Srinandan, cultural director of Mumbai’s Seawoods Estates Limited, noting that the remarks it contained were intended to obstruct the administration of justice and interfere with the due course of judicial proceedings. The circular was issued while a case concerning the feeding of stray dogs in the Seawoods complex was pending before the High Court, in which residents had challenged the validity of Rule 20 of the Animal Birth Control Rules, 2023. The rule obligates resident welfare associations and apartment owner associations to create designated spaces for feeding stray animals. The Seawoods complex houses over 1,500 residents in Navi Mumbai.

Opinion: Contempt powers, in the people’s name

The High Court had held that the circular carried “serious insinuations” against judges of the High Court and the Supreme Court, and rejected Ms. Srinandan’s contention that she was unaware of the implications of issuing such remarks. It had also declined to accept her apology, finding that it did not demonstrate contrition or genuine remorse. Consequently, the court had imposed a fine of ₹2,000 and directed that she undergo imprisonment for a period of one week.

Deprecating the approach adopted by the High Court, the apex court observed that it had failed to exercise its contempt jurisdiction with the requisite circumspection, particularly since Ms. Srinandan had, from the very first day of her appearance in the suo motu proceedings, expressed remorse and tendered an unconditional apology.

It further noted that Section 12 of the 1971 Act clarifies that an apology need not be rejected merely because it is qualified or conditional, so long as it is tendered bona fide. The statutory framework, it said, recognises that once a contemnor offers sincere remorse, the court is empowered to accept it and, where appropriate, discharge the contemnor or remit the sentence imposed.

“In our opinion, in the absence of any material suggesting that the apology was lacking in bona fides, the High Court ought to have considered remitting the sentence in accordance with law,” the Bench said, setting aside the order of the High Court.

In its 21-page ruling, the High Court had observed that although Section 12 of the 1971 Act prescribes a punishment of up to 6 months or a fine of up to ₹2,000, or both, for the offence, it had imposed a relatively shorter sentence on Ms. Srinandan. In our clear opinion, the contemnor has taken every opportunity to justify, on merits, the circumstances in which she issued such objectionable writing, while simultaneously reciting the apology mantra. We do not accept any apology that does not reflect contrition or genuine remorse. Such an apology, in our view, is merely a defensive weapon advanced in the belief that the contemnor can escape the consequences by its recital,” the High Court had recorded in its order.

Published – December 10, 2025 07:17 pm IST

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *