John Howard’s Defence and foreign affairs ministers told him not to return Australian special forces to Afghanistan in 2005, new Cabinet papers reveal.
But they were overruled when the Prime Minister’s national security committee instead agreed to a deployment that was only supposed to send 190 troops for 12 months.
Ultimately, some 3000 SAS personnel made 20 rotations to Afghanistan’s Uruzgan Province in what became known as Australia’s “forever war”.
Sign up to The Nightly’s newsletters.
Get the first look at the digital newspaper, curated daily stories and breaking headlines delivered to your inbox.
By continuing you agree to our Terms and Privacy Policy.
Australia’s entire military engagement in Afghanistan, running until mid-2021, cost $8.4 billion and the lives of 41 Defence personnel.
The 2005 Cabinet papers released by the National Archives on January 1 reveal for the first time that ministers Robert Hill and Alexander Downer explicitly recommended Australia stare down US requests to send special forces back to Afghanistan.
John Howard, Peter Costello, and Alexander Downer at a meeting. Credit: Chris Lane CJL/Fairfax
Sending the SAS was too risky, especially while the US was drawing back its own air and combat support, Mr Hill and Mr Downer warned, and it wouldn’t serve Australia’s diplomatic and strategic interests.
“We recommend that . . . Defence decline the US request for a discrete ADF special forces contribution to operations in Afghanistan operating in a dedicated combat role,” they wrote in a submission to a July 12 meeting of Cabinet’s national security committee.
They recommended instead sending only a modest contribution of 50 soldiers as part of a NATO-led Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), costing about $15 million.
However, the Howard-led Cabinet committee decided that Australia would deploy both special forces and a reconstruction team.
Then-US president George W Bush’s administration had repeatedly asked Australia to return its special forces to Afghanistan since they were first withdrawn in 2002.
But UK Cabinet papers also released this week show Tony Blair and his advisers had been pressing Australia to focus on joining the NATO-led efforts.
Australian soldiers crewing a Surveillance Reconnaissance Vehicle (SRV) prepare to move at sunrise during a joint Australian and Afghan patrol. Credit: CAPT Alan Green
Mr Downer told Mr Blair’s foreign policy and defence adviser Nigel Sheinwald in January that “any contribution was likely to be minor” with Australia focused on Iraq, while Mr Hill had told him a month earlier that Mr Howard wasn’t keen on sending more troops to Afghanistan and that it was “a tricky political issue,” meeting notes show.
That attitude had clearly changed by July 2005.
Within days of rolling his ministers and announcing the SAS deployment, Mr Howard was in Washington meeting Mr Bush with the “war on terror” high on their agenda, before heading to London for similar talks with Mr Blair.
“While a special forces deployment could meet some strategic interests, we do not consider that this warrants the risk involved,” Mr Hill and Mr Downer wrote in their submission.
“Defence has the capacity to make a contribution to Afghanistan but there are significant risks. There are risks of casualties, some of which can be mitigated . . . but which cannot be eliminated.”
Mr Howard acknowledged this when he farewelled the SAS from Campbell Barracks in late August.
Prime Minister John Howard meets soldiers of the Australian Special Forces Task Group deployed on Operation Slipper in Afghanistan. Credit: SGT John Carroll
“You are professional enough to know that this mission will have its dangers, there is a risk of casualties, you all know that, there is no point in my pretending otherwise,” the Prime Minister said.
The cabinet papers show the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet flagged ahead of the meeting that there was “insufficient information” from the ministers about options for a special forces deployment.
“PM&C understands that the Chief of the Defence Force will provide the Committee with an oral briefing on this option that will provide Ministers with a better basis for judging the relative merits of each option,” the department’s comments in the papers state.
It was a hint of the change of mind to come.
Mr Howard told media the next day, announcing the deployment of a Special Forces task group, that “the Government has been informed by the Chief of the Defence Force that the commitment is well within the capacity of the ADF”.
He said there was a 12-month limit on the deployment because the SAS’s “greater elite security capacity” was needed back home to support the 2006 Melbourne Commonwealth Games and Australia hosting APEC in 2007.
Prime Minister John Howard shaking hands
with US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice,
during a meeting with US President George
W Bush in the Oval Office, White House,
Washington DC, 19 July 2005. Credit: Peter West
Cabinet papers showing how discussions around the extension of the special forces deployment played out will be released in a year’s time.
Mr Hill and Mr Downer had also cautioned Cabinet colleagues that the complex situation in Afghanistan “may make it difficult to identify a suitable end-point for any Australian contribution, and it may be difficult and costly to disengage from operations once we were committed”.
Treasury and Finance also raised concerns about the cost of making an open-ended commitment of forces, the cabinet documents show.
