During his recent visit to Hanoi , U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth inked a new pact with Vietnam to reaffirm U.S. cooperation on sensitive war legacy issues. The memorandum of understanding covered several key issues from the Vietnam War era, including Agent Orange decontamination, unexploded ordnance removal, and better information exchange to determine the whereabouts of killed or missing soldiers from both countries.

Washington should handle these war legacy issues not only because it’s the morally right thing to do, but also because it makes for smarter strategy. Such programs reduce the Vietnamese perception that Washington is exclusively engaging Hanoi in order to counter China—an approach that has sometimes worried Vietnamese leaders, who strenuously seek to avoid aligning with either side of the great-power competition that is intensifying across Southeast Asia. Additionally, the people-to-people ties that such projects usually entail will further instill trust in the United States for future generations of Vietnamese, some of whom will rise to leadership positions in the Communist Party and state structure. These connections will fuel U.S.-Vietnam relations in a positive direction for decades to come.

During his recent visit to Hanoi , U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth inked a new pact with Vietnam to reaffirm U.S. cooperation on sensitive war legacy issues. The memorandum of understanding covered several key issues from the Vietnam War era, including Agent Orange decontamination, unexploded ordnance removal, and better information exchange to determine the whereabouts of killed or missing soldiers from both countries.

Washington should handle these war legacy issues not only because it’s the morally right thing to do, but also because it makes for smarter strategy. Such programs reduce the Vietnamese perception that Washington is exclusively engaging Hanoi in order to counter China—an approach that has sometimes worried Vietnamese leaders, who strenuously seek to avoid aligning with either side of the great-power competition that is intensifying across Southeast Asia. Additionally, the people-to-people ties that such projects usually entail will further instill trust in the United States for future generations of Vietnamese, some of whom will rise to leadership positions in the Communist Party and state structure. These connections will fuel U.S.-Vietnam relations in a positive direction for decades to come.

This is an important and positive development for both Washington and Hanoi. Perhaps more significantly, it also suggests that the Trump administration isn’t necessarily against dispensing aid after the shuttering of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) by the Department of Government Efficiency run by Elon Musk earlier this year—especially when that aid goes to key allies and partners. Take the example of Vietnam: In 2023, Hanoi elevated bilateral ties to be at the level of a comprehensive strategic partnership—on par with China, India, Russia, and several other powers. This elevation of the U.S.-Vietnam relationship could strengthen overall ties and help Washington counter Beijing. It stands to reason that the Trump administration might want to keep relations with Hanoi and other partners in good health. Releasing U.S. assistance that had been blocked by the USAID shutdown—or even increasing it, as Washington did when it topped up its original grant package for Agent Orange removal with an additional $130 million for a total of $430 million in aid—simply makes good strategic sense.

Vietnam is just the latest example of several nations that have benefited from the Trump administration’s new take on U.S. foreign aid, codified under Executive Order 14169 with the title “Reevaluating and Realigning United States Foreign Aid.” When Trump signed the order on Jan. 20, it set off a 90-day pause and review of nearly all aid; among the few exceptions, Taiwan was a notable carve-out. More recently, Washington has been revisiting the issue and slowly rolling out new funding decisions.

Welcome to post-USAID foreign policy under Trump.

Before Hegseth’s visit to Vietnam, the Trump administration quietly provided a grant of $675,000 to neighboring Cambodia to continue demining programs there. Torn apart by almost continuous wars from 1970 to 1998, Cambodia is in dire need of external assistance to remove unexploded ordnance from all across its territory. According to one estimate, Cambodia remains littered with 4 to 6 million land mines and unexploded munitions today—and that’s after the destruction of 4 million items since 1992. These have killed nearly 20,000 people and injured around 45,000 since the end of the 1970s. When Trump attended the ASEAN summit in October, he presided over a cease-fire agreement between Cambodia and Thailand, and he signed two additional deals with Phnom Penh—one was to secure its critical minerals and the other was related to reducing U.S. tariffs on some Cambodian exports over time. In conjunction with the demining grant, these steps are finally empowering Washington to play offense in Beijing’s own strategic backyard, where Cambodia has traditionally been a close Chinese ally.

Another example of the Trump administration reversing previous aid cuts or pauses can be found in the Philippines, a U.S. treaty ally. Jonathan Fritz, principal deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, said in September that Washington would keep the aid flowing to Manila for programs aimed at curbing illegal fishing within its exclusive economic zone in the South China Sea. At a roundtable in Manila, Fritz said, “The message that we want to convey to our Filipino friends is you guys were the first recipients of new assistance funding. I think that will sort of set a mark.” The United States also plans to continue other programs in the Philippines, including for disaster preparedness, health security, AIDS, and tuberculosis prevention.

At present, it’s unclear whether Washington has reversed other aid decisions. But the cases in Southeast Asia show that the Trump administration has already started to revisit the aid suspensions enacted under his executive order. More nations will likely start to benefit in the coming weeks and months.

One region to watch closely is the Pacific islands. Because countries there are overwhelmingly small and impoverished, their dependence on U.S. assistance is extremely high—especially in areas like disaster relief, health security, and economic development. This is of grave concern to the most powerful countries in Oceania: Australia and New Zealand. In recent months, Canberra and Wellington have felt compelled to pick up some of the slack from U.S. aid cuts. In March, New Zealand Foreign Minister Winston Peters was in Washington and met with the then-acting administrator of USAID, Peter Maroco, and the outcome gave Peters a reason to be upbeat. After the meeting, he remarked that Trump officials “get our point of view in terms of how essential [U.S. aid] is … we are looking ahead with more confidence than when we arrived.”

At stake is approximately $1 billion previously pledged to the Pacific island region during the Biden administration. Now, with USAID gone and its remnants merged into the State Department, it will be up to U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio to decide the fate of this funding. During the first Trump administration, Washington was keen on countering China across the Pacific island region. It is less clear if Trump 2.0 shares this approach, but if it does, then U.S. aid would likely start to flow there once again.

In yet another Indo-Pacific region—South Asia—there may also be reason for cautious optimism. In Sri Lanka, the United States has long been the leading donor supporting demining and ordnance removal. Although the Trump administration’s elimination of USAID initially caused deep concern in Colombo, Washington subsequently issued an exemption that allowed some humanitarian and security-related programs to continue. Sri Lanka was expected to receive a final decision by May 1, but the date passed without public clarification. Still, U.S. foreign assistance data confirms that demining remains an active line item, suggesting that the work continues. Even if there has been a temporary funding lapse, the program appears more likely than not to be sustained, given Sri Lanka’s strategic location along critical sea lanes and the administration’s incentive to maintain influence there amid China’s growing footprint. Contrast Washington’s treatment of Sri Lanka with Nepal, a land-locked resident of South Asia that offers few geostrategic advantages, and U.S. aid there shows no sign of being resuscitated.

Of course, the Trump administration has not yet restored U.S. aid to every country in the world that holds strategic value on the geopolitical map. It is very likely that it never will, at least not for most. Thus, the Trump administration’s realignment of U.S. assistance should be carefully observed for other common themes and criteria in order to better understand Washington’s new approach. For now, at least, the theme seems to be this: If a country is of strategic value to the United States in its competition against China, some aid will continue. It may not be the only or primary factor, but strategic relevance is helpful in convincing the Trump administration to restore past aid.