Welcome to Foreign Policy’s South Asia Brief.

The highlights this week: Afghanistan and Pakistan reach a fragile cease-fire after a deadly spate of border violence, India’s Russian oil imports remain a sticking point for U.S. President Donald Trump, and India moves closer to officially reopening its embassy in Kabul.

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Afghanistan, Pakistan Don’t Agree on Their Border

Afghanistan and Pakistan reached a cease-fire agreement on Sunday that ended more than a week of fighting between the two countries, following talks mediated by Qatar and Turkey.

The violence was the worst between the two countries since the Taliban returned to power in 2021: Pakistan’s counterterrorism strikes and Afghan retaliation against Pakistani troops at the border killed dozens of people. Afghanistan says that Pakistan’s strikes killed civilians, including three cricket players, while Islamabad says that it only targeted militants.

From Pakistan’s perspective, the good news about the cease-fire was quickly spoiled by a related announcement: Qatar’s government, possibly under Taliban pressure, revised its public statement about the truce to remove a reference to reducing tensions on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.

This wasn’t just a syntax edit—it tapped into deep-seated differences between the two countries’ interpretations of their rugged border, known as the Durand Line. To be sure, cross-border terrorism has long been the proximate trigger for Afghanistan-Pakistan tensions, including the recent crisis. But it’s important not to overlook the arguably more intractable issue of the border itself.

The Durand Line was demarcated in 1893, after negotiations between Henry Mortimer Durand, the foreign secretary of British colonial India, and Abdur Rahman Khan, the Afghan leader appointed by Britain after its brief occupation of Afghanistan. The line marked the frontier between Afghanistan and India. Following the Partition of India in 1947, it became the division between Afghanistan and the new state of Pakistan.

Pakistan has long accepted the border, as has the international community. However, no Afghan government—including the current Taliban regime—has ever recognized it as such, rejecting it as a decision imposed on Afghans by the British. In recent years, this divergence has played out in various ways, from Afghan militants attacking Pakistani soldiers constructing border fencing to Pakistani concerns about irredentism.

The Durand Line also divides ethnic Pashtun communities, and it has inspired movements for an independent “Pashtunistan”—which Pakistani officials and some scholars say are sponsored by Afghan intelligence. Today, many Afghans still claim Pakistan’s Pashtun areas. (This is one reason why Pakistan’s security establishment mistrusts Pashtun rights activists, even as they focus on discrimination, state-sponsored violence, and internal grievances.)

The cease-fire might not hold. The Taliban never turn on their closest militant allies, even under pressure. Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which has ramped up attacks on Pakistan from its bases in Afghanistan, is among them. And if the TTP and other terror groups based across the border continue to hit Pakistani security forces, they likely won’t hesitate to carry out fresh strikes.

The border issue compounds the challenge, spawning deep mistrust that will make it more difficult for Afghanistan and Pakistan to reach understandings on other sensitive matters, including cross-border terrorism.

Additionally, rooting out terrorism won’t fix the border dispute—a sobering reality for both countries. The inevitability of long-term bilateral strain will undermine economic interests for Afghanistan; Pakistan is a key source of employment, education, and health care. Islamabad, meanwhile, will continue to grapple with a three-front border challenge: with Afghanistan to the northwest, India to the east, and Iran to the west.

What We’re Following

Trump says India will cut Russian oil. Last week, U.S. President Donald Trump said that Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi had informed him that India would stop importing Russian oil. New Delhi quickly indicated—very diplomatically—that the two leaders had not spoken. But on Tuesday, Trump called Modi to offer Diwali greetings and said afterward that the Indian leader had assured him that the country won’t “buy much oil from Russia.”

If true, this would be a significant development on a major source of U.S.-India tensions. In August, the Trump administration slapped a 25 percent tariff on India in response to its continued Russian oil imports. However, Trump’s claims are suspect: A sudden stop to New Delhi’s energy imports would beggar belief.

India did end its imports of Iranian oil several years ago to avoid U.S. sanctions risks—but Tehran is not nearly as close a friend to New Delhi as Moscow. India also had immediate supplier alternatives to Iran (including Saudi Arabia); it would likely be more amenable to reducing its Russian oil imports if it could find an alternative at the right price point.

New Delhi could also conceivably offer to reduce some imports as a bargaining tactic in trade talks with Washington, which some Indian reports are suggesting. Either way, the two leaders may soon have an opportunity to discuss this in person: Trump is expected to attend the ASEAN summit in Malaysia next week, and Modi will likely be there, too.

For more on the ASEAN summit and which world leaders might meet on the sidelines, read this week’s Southeast Asia Brief from Jakarta-based Joseph Rachman.

India moves closer to reopening Kabul embassy. On Tuesday, India’s External Affairs Ministry announced that its technical mission in Kabul has been upgraded to an embassy “with immediate effect.” This means that New Delhi is moving closer to formally reopening the embassy, which was officially shuttered when the Taliban returned to power in 2021.

Since June 2022, the facility has been used to maintain a small technical team focused on humanitarian aid and consular assistance. India’s decision to reopen the embassy was one of the major outcomes of Afghan Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi’s weeklong visit to India that concluded last Thursday.

That India moved so quickly to implement the change speaks to how keen it is to keep stepping up engagement with the Taliban. New Delhi will soon appoint a charge d’affaires to head the embassy, with a formal ambassador to be appointed later. However, India has not indicated that it has any plans to formally recognize the Taliban government.

Nepal PM hosts interparty meeting. On Tuesday, Nepal’s interim prime minister, Sushila Karki, hosted a meeting about the country’s March elections with the leaders of a range of parties in the now-dissolved House of Representatives. Little information about the meeting was made public, though it does bode well for the country’s immediate political future.

Nepal has been unsettled since anti-corruption protests last month ousted Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli; Karki will serve as premier until the polls take place. That she held the talks suggests a desire to ensure political consensus around the elections and to reduce the risk of further instability.

The move also appears to reflect an effort to avoid the more turbulent path taken by Bangladesh, where a mass movement removed longtime Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in August 2024. There, the interim government took a year to make a decision on elections, now scheduled for February—and politics have remained polarized.

FP’s Most Read This Week

Under the Radar

This month, the U.S. State Department reissued a travel advisory for the Maldives, urging travelers to be mindful of terrorism risks. The travel advisory level remains unchanged at level 2 (increased caution), and it’s unclear if new information prompted the United States to reissue the advisory or if it was simply a routine reminder.

Level 2 is relatively mild for South Asia. Bangladesh, Nepal, and Pakistan are all currently at level 3, and Afghanistan is at level 4. Still, given the Maldives’ fragile economy and its heavy dependence on tourism revenue, the new advisory will not have gone unnoticed by officials in Male.

The Maldives has grappled with some terrorism challenges, including its status as a top recruitment center for the Islamic State. Last year, Israel issued its own travel warning about the Maldives, noting specific threats and hostility toward Israeli tourists. However, in April, the Maldives announced a ban on Israeli passport holders visiting the country in response to Israel’s war conduct in Gaza.