Welcome to Foreign Policy’s Southeast Asia Brief.
The highlights this week: ASEAN’s summit makes Kuala Lumpur a geopolitical hub, Laos considers cutting power to crypto miners, a royal baby is announced in Brunei, and scam gangs’ state ties are exposed in Cambodia.
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This year’s summit of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) runs this Sunday, Oct. 26, through Tuesday. The U.S.-China trade war will be the main item on the agenda, with an expected bilateral discussion of rare earths occuring on the sidelines.
ASEAN has its own priorities too, including the admission of a new member, Timor-Leste.
An unusually prominent lineup of expected guests includes U.S. President Donald Trump, Chinese Premier Li Qiang, Russian President Vladimir Putin, Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni.
World leaders seem to like that the bloc tends to be resolutely impartial in geopolitics, and they are also keen to cultivate friendships in a region central to the global economy.
Still, the most consequential meeting may not be between leaders but, rather, a planned discussion between U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng.
The pair will discuss China’s sweeping restrictions on exports of rare earths and products using them. Trump has responded by threatening new 100 percent tariffs on China as well as controls on exports of software to China.
Bessent and He will also set the tone for a potential meeting between Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping. Trump has suggested that this will take place at the upcoming Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in South Korea, which will be held from Oct. 31 to Nov. 1. (Xi, as usual, is not attending the ASEAN summit.)
For the ASEAN summit, Trump has said that he will only attend if he can preside over the signing of a peace deal between Cambodia and Thailand to cement a cease-fire that he says he played a role in brokering.
And, oh—China can’t be in the room when it happens, at the request of White House officials.
Whether the peace deal will go ahead seems uncertain. As I wrote last week, negotiations between the two nations seem to be breaking down. Thailand’s prime minister has also indicated that he’s not interested in further U.S. involvement.
ASEAN itself is focused on dealing with the repercussions of the United States becoming an economic rogue state.
Attempts to coordinate on this have been limited so far, with countries stampeding to cut individual deals with Trump.
What is scheduled—an upgrade of ASEAN’s trade deal with China and the adoption of the bloc’s new digital economic framework—is not going to set the world on fire. Nonetheless, it does indicate the direction of travel: hedging against the United States by integrating both internally and with external partners.
What’s buzzier is the expectation that the ASEAN Power Grid may finally pick up momentum.
The idea of regional integration of electricity grids has been knocking around since the 1980s. But the challenges of decarbonization have given the idea new impetus: rain affecting solar panels in Thailand could be balanced by a sunny day in Vietnam.
Any developments here could invigorate the slow and piecemeal energy projects that are already underway across the region, though a project this big remains a very long-term endeavor. It’s worth noting that ASEAN’s largest country, Indonesia, doesn’t even have a single national grid.
Last but not least, Timor-Leste is finally joining ASEAN. The two-decade process once prompted President José Ramos Horta to complain that it was easier to get into heaven than ASEAN. Some think that Timor’s accession might bolster ASEAN’s democratic camp, and the United States may benefit from the country’s inclusion in the bloc.
However, the thing to watch is Timor’s position on Myanmar. Run by former revolutionaries, Timor-Leste has been vocally sympathetic to the National Unity Government currently fighting Myanmar’s ruling junta. But recently, Dili’s push for ASEAN accession has seen a softening of its line on the military rulers. What happens when Timor-Leste is in the tent?
Laos says no to crypto. Laos’s government is considering ending the provision of electricity to cryptocurrency miners in the first quarter of 2026, according to reporting by Reuters.
The government said it was planning to prioritize power for sectors that would contribute more to the economy—such artificial intelligence data centers, metals refining, and electric vehicles.
The move represents a sharp shift in strategy from the country, which has looked to crypto to monetize its vast hydroelectric power potential—potential that has seen it dubbed the “battery of Asia.”
Laos’s entanglement with crypto kicked off in 2021, when the government announced that it would allow crypto companies to mine and sell in the country while paying a capped energy fee to do so. That same year, China banned crypto mining, prompting many players in what had been the world’s biggest crypto mining market to relocate their operations.
Another incentive seems to have been the dangerous levels of debt that had accumulated during the country’s dam-building spree. The plan had been to export green energy and a lot has been sold abroad in recent years.
But the crypto boom has caused headaches. Energy-hungry crypto has caused blackouts during the dry season, when hydropower runs low. And in the wet season, the country generates more than it can export due to a lack of transmission infrastructure.
Plans for a regional grid that would let Laos sell to rich and power-hungry Singapore have stalled. Laos’s state electricity company is being sued by a state-owned Chinese construction company over unpaid debts.
Indonesian army clashes with insurgents. The Indonesian army and independence fighters clashed in the restive region of Papua on Oct. 15, leaving more than a dozen dead.
In a statement, the Indonesian military claimed that it had killed 14 separatist fighters who had attacked troops while armed with conventional weapons as wells as bows and arrows. The insurgents said the Indonesian military had killed nine civilians.
The clash came as Indonesian troops prepared to assault a rebel post in the village of Soanggama in the Intan Jaya district of the Central Papua province. The Indonesian military claimed that the village has been a hotbed of insurgency.
Fighting in the region seems to have escalated this year. While information is hard to confirm, it seems that the Indonesian military has stepped up its operations. And more locals are responding by joining independence fighters in the jungle.
Papua has long been marked by conflict. The ongoing struggle can be traced back to 1962, when the region’s leaders demanded a referendum for independence but instead saw the territory incorporated into the Indonesian nation via the “Act of Free Choice,” which saw 1,022 Papuan tribal representatives coerced into voting to join Indonesia.
Brunei’s royal baby. Brunei’s Prince Abdul Mateen, 34, and his wife, Princess Anisha Rosnah, 30, announced on Oct. 14 that they are expecting their first child. The prince is only fifth in the line of succession of the oil-rich absolute monarchy, so the political implications of his progeny are limited.
Still, the announcement—broken on Instagram with an artistic black-and-white shot—has caused a ripple of interest.
Prince Mateen retains a certain celebrity status, and his wealth and success as an international polo player saw him dubbed “Asia’s most eligible bachelor” prior to his wedding.
The wedding last year was an extravagant affair that lasted 10 days, attended by royals from around the world and leaders from across Southeast Asia.
42—That’s how many Chinese J-10 fighter jets Indonesia is proposing to buy, with a total price tag of $9 billion.
Indonesia had previously struck a deal with France to buy 42 Rafale jets. While some seem to have already been delivered, Jakarta seems to be hedging its bets.
The J-10’s reported success shooting down Rafale jets during the Pakistan-India clash in May is apparently one factor, according to conversations that I’ve had.
Indonesia’s air force already has planes from seven different countries. It makes integration a nightmare, but the U.S. arms embargo that was in place for the country from 1999-2005 has left Indonesia wary of relying on any one supplier.
Two women wearing red gesture with their hands. One is in a hat of red roses, the other is wearing elaborate eyewear.
Supporters of former Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra gather outside of the Khlong Prem Central Prison in Bangkok, Thailand, on Oct. 18.Matt Hunt/Anadolu via Getty Images
So-called red shirts, supporters of former Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, gathered on the weekend to protest outside the prison where Shinawatra is serving a one-year sentence on charges of corruption and abuse of power. The 76-year-old leader has remained a central figure in Thai politics despite being ousted in a coup in 2006 and spending years in exile—though his party’s influence now seems to be fading. It has been reported that while in prison he will oversee sewer cleaning. There are also suggestions that he could teach English to other prisoners.
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Vietnamese poll respondents are getting more positive about China. Why? One reason could be TikTok, Phuong Nguyen and Francesco Guarascio report for Reuters.
“China is moving into the gap, especially in Asia.” After the United States slashed aid, China may be stepping up its own efforts at a time when organizations are desperate for support, Kenji Kawase reports for Nikkei Asia.
With Indonesian security issues in the news, Rahman Yaacob, a research fellow at the Lowy Institute, provides an excellent overview of Indonesia’s strategic thought in the Interpreter. For many in the military, the main threat is not China but, rather, Western countries that they suspect of wanting to break up Indonesia, Yaacob writes.
For defense tech, the Philippines is looking to Ukraine for lessons, Marites Dañguilan Vitug writes in Rappler. Ukrainian prowess is impressing the Philippines as it tries to up its military capacity in the face of a bellicose China.
Cambodia’s scam state. A U.S.- and U.K.-led operation against Cambodian criminal groups operating scam compounds has highlighted the deep ties between these organizations and the Cambodian government. “In decades past, we had the narcostate. Today, we have the scam state,” Jack Davies, a journalist who has reported extensively on this issue, told me.
On Oct. 14, the United States—working with the United Kingdom—indicted Chen Zhi, the chair of the Prince Group, whose website proclaims that it is “one of the largest conglomerates in Cambodia.” The United States also sanctioned 146 targets associated with the company and moved to seize $15 billion in its bitcoin holdings. The U.S. Justice Department called the Prince Group “one of Asia’s largest transnational criminal organizations.”
On Oct. 16, there were more sanctions, this time against Huione—a company linked to a cousin of the prime minister—over its alleged role in scams and money laundering for criminals and North Korea. More may be coming; an anti-scam bill recently introduced in the U.S. Congress recommends sanctions against 43 people, including Cambodian Deputy Prime Minister Neth Savoeun and Interior Minister Sar Sokha.
Scam compounds in Cambodia and other countries in the region are fortified campuses where thousands of coerced workers con money from targets overseas. The profits are huge. A 2025 report by Jacob Sims, an expert on transnational crime who now a term member at the Council on Foreign Relations, estimated that the industry’s value for the Cambodian economy is $12.5 billion to $19 billion a year, equivalent to as much as 60 percent of Cambodia’s GDP.
The Prince Group exemplifies the intertwining of crime, Cambodian institutions, global finance, and even geopolitics. Experts say that this group has deep and wide-ranging relationships with the Cambodian government.
“Given Chen Zhi’s wealth of connections to Cambodia’s ruling elite, this is a direct challenge to a regime that has built its political durability on elite coercion, criminal impunity, and predation,” Sims told Foreign Policy.
With the enormous revenues that they generate Prince and other companies like it can access the highest levels of government. In 2022, when Cambodia hosted that year’s ASEAN summit, then-Prime Minister Hun Sen handed out watches produced by Prince Horology—collectively worth millions—to visiting world leaders.
Where the scam state differs from the narcostate is that unlike for drugs, control of territory is not important for scam operation. So, while people tricked and trafficked into working in the compounds are subject to abuse and murder, locals are usually not bothered.
“The general consensus is you find almost no Cambodians trafficked into there,” Davies said. “If it happened to locals, I think it would become a serious liability for the ruling party.”
Today, the groups are so embedded that Davies argues that they are a key part of the political economy. The money they generate helps power Cambodia’s patronage system like illegal logging once did, he said, adding, “Cambodia is feudalism plus capitalism plus gangsterism.”
The organizations are now big enough to even intrude on international politics. Sanctions by the United States—which is seeing a small rapprochement with Cambodia—do not target Cambodian politicians. Meanwhile, according to reporting by Radio Free Asia, the Prince Group has been alleged to have been involved in plots ranging from a failed attempt to kidnap an overseas dissident to influence operations in Palau. Some even think that scam groups played a role in the country’s brief border war with Thailand in July.
