China has thrown its weight behind Russia’s war in Ukraine, but this has not focused European leaders’ minds as much as it should. From Beijing’s financial lifeline to Moscow to its supplies of critical technology to the Russian arms industry, the China-Russia “partnership without limits” has very real implications for the war in Ukraine—and for all of Europe’s future security.
Early this year, I argued that Washington reducing its commitments to European defense would tempt Beijing to do a “Kissinger” on the trans-Atlantic alliance, showering the European Union with gifts to pull it out of the U.S. orbit. Some time has passed, so it is worthwhile to check how things turned out.
China has thrown its weight behind Russia’s war in Ukraine, but this has not focused European leaders’ minds as much as it should. From Beijing’s financial lifeline to Moscow to its supplies of critical technology to the Russian arms industry, the China-Russia “partnership without limits” has very real implications for the war in Ukraine—and for all of Europe’s future security.
Early this year, I argued that Washington reducing its commitments to European defense would tempt Beijing to do a “Kissinger” on the trans-Atlantic alliance, showering the European Union with gifts to pull it out of the U.S. orbit. Some time has passed, so it is worthwhile to check how things turned out.
In February, the Trump administration’s increasing hostility toward Europe and public questioning of U.S. security commitments spurred Chinese diplomats into a flurry of activity in Europe, as they met with officials at the Munich Security Conference and in various capitals. This included reaching out to decision-makers who had previously received little attention due to their critical stance on China.
Ever since Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, European leaders have been virtually begging China to help end it. When U.S. President Donald Trump shifted Washington’s attention away from Europe, China could not have had a better moment to respond to the appeal. Europe would have been prepared to pay a big price for such assistance. Items on China’s wish list might have included assurances of noninterference in the Indo-Pacific and greater access to European markets and technology. Becoming a European security guarantor as part of a Beijing-brokered peace deal—an unimaginable geopolitical concept until recently—would have been a crowning achievement for China.
Coupled with Europe’s sense that its traditional trans-Atlantic mooring was coming loose, the drift toward China appeared unstoppable at the time. Europe can barely survive without imports of Chinese rare earths, and differences in levels of market access among EU members suggest that parts of Europe were already moving in China’s direction.
Beijing’s leverage over Moscow could have been the basis for a broad accommodation. China has become a major supplier of weapons manufacturing equipment for Russia’s war efforts, the latest example being a Chinese-built ammunition factory in Belarus, a Russian satrapy. China’s purchases of Russian oil are a financial lifeline for the Kremlin. Had Beijing used this leverage to curb the conflict, it could have played an outsized role in European security and gained great favor in European capitals. Had China proved capable of stopping Europe’s largest war since World War II, it could have demanded almost any price in future negotiations. Resistance to Chinese imports, such as electric vehicles and 5G telecommunications equipment, would have crumbled if China had brought Russia to heel and assumed the role of peace guarantor in Europe.
Spain is an early example of how a more Sinified Europe could have looked: Madrid has rejected Washington’s push to increase defense spending and is pursuing stronger ties with Beijing instead. China could have assumed that, with the United States shifting its attention away from Europe, more countries would follow Spain’s lead and respond to Chinese overtures.
But instead of dangling carrots before Europe, China has doubled down on providing Russia with sticks. Analysts estimate that 80 to 90 percent of Russian military output is produced using Chinese equipment or components. This suggests that if China were to withdraw support, Russia would be unable to continue fighting at its current strength or would be forced to compensate for reduced equipment production by mobilizing a much larger number of its men, returning to the human wave tactics seen during earlier phases of the war.
China has chosen to go all-in with its sickly, vulnerable neighbor. It is facilitating aggression and disruption of life in Europe and has clearly given up any attempt to become the continent’s new geopolitical pole.
Chinese leaders may have calculated that even under the current U.S. administration, Europe’s long-standing trans-Atlantic bonds would be difficult to break. Their Russian ally, on the other hand, is cornered. Russian President Vladimir Putin cannot stop or even slow the war without risking the stability of his regime. Without Chinese support in the war, he would have to tax and mobilize the Russian middle class, which he has so far tried to shield, risking wider dissatisfaction. He undoubtedly remembers how public shock at Soviet losses in Afghanistan—including among the families of the fallen soldiers—was one of the factors that sped up the collapse of the Soviet Union, which Putin laments to this day.
China argues that its companies are free to sell equipment to Ukraine, too. This is disingenuous on several counts. First, Ukraine receives only civilian components, not the drone and rocket parts that Russia gets. Second, China limits the quantity and quality of supplies that reach Ukraine, thereby ensuring that Russia maintains an edge. Prioritizing Russia is a strategic move for China, whereas Chinese deliveries to Ukraine are mainly commercial—no more than a way to extract profit from Ukraine’s misery.
The ability to influence and potentially steer Russia’s military activity in Europe—whether in Ukraine or elsewhere—is a major asset worth keeping and expanding. With Russia’s war in Ukraine and gray-zone attacks on NATO countries, Europe’s energies are entirely focused on its own security, leaving it unlikely to help the United States in the event of an Indo-Pacific conflict. At the same time, China’s support for Russia gives it leverage over Moscow’s actions.
China may also wish to use its new leverage over Russia to access the more lucrative parts of the Russian economy. Given China’s essential role in the Russian military economy, it’s reasonable to assume that an economizing Kremlin is paying with equity, not cash. If the war drags on, it is plausible that China will acquire further stakes in the Russian economy, eventually targeting its most valuable assets: natural resources.
Western sanctions and Ukraine’s long-range attacks are limiting Russia’s ability to extract and export oil and other commodities. Some of the damaged facilities can only be rebuilt with Western technology that Russia is currently barred from buying. China can offer assistance, even if it does not currently produce all the needed equipment. Once China develops or acquires the technology, it will be able to provide whatever Russia needs. China will thus acquire more of the Russian economy, and Moscow will have little ability to resist.
Finally, the Chinese remember their history. In the 19th century, the expanding Russian Empire seized vast territories from Qing Dynasty China. The current Chinese leadership is obsessed with fixing what it calls historic injustices, the justification for its ambitions in the South China Sea and toward Taiwan. So far, China has not been vocal about correcting its northeastern border. But as China’s leverage over Russia grows, the day when Beijing asks Moscow to return Outer Manchuria could come sooner than expected.
Russia’s dependence on China is now almost existential. Without Chinese support, Putin’s regime would be in serious danger of collapse. This one-sided dependency effectively makes Russia a Chinese vassal state—an echo of Muscovy’s medieval subservience to the Mongols. If Muscovy’s modern successor is forced by China to provide troops for campaigns in the Indo-Pacific, the irony will be complete.
Looking at all these developments together, a clear picture emerges. China, despite initial overtures from both sides, is not interested in reshaping its relationship with Europe. The benefits of supporting Russia against Europe suit Beijing’s long-term strategy far better than the uncertain benefits of closer relations with Europe today. China has no interest in bringing peace to Europe or rebuilding Ukraine, as some in Europe naively hoped. Instead, China is building a politically and economically integrated system with a subservient Russia.
Putin gets his own clear benefits from this arrangement. Even before the war, the corrupt authoritarian extraction economy he established in Russia was not sustainable, and he was never prepared to seriously reform it. To keep his system politically alive, he offered Russians a new social contract based on the ambition to restore past imperial glory. Russians have embraced Putin’s vision of rebuilding an empire and do not seem very concerned about the costs. Putin’s domestic legitimacy now depends on military success and territorial expansion. This he cannot do without China’s support.
Washington gains very little by leaving Europe at the mercy of the Moscow-Beijing axis. A weakened Europe—especially if Russia takes the war beyond Ukraine—would be unable to assist the United States. It is entirely plausible that Russia would support China politically, militarily, and otherwise in an Indo-Pacific conflict.
Europe no longer faces just Russia, a weakened rogue state. Europe faces an ever-strengthening alliance committed to shattering Western solidarity. China has made its choice known, and it’s time that both Europe and the United States recognize the security implications of this Sino-Russian axis in Europe and far beyond.
